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Abstract
We study trade between a buyer and a seller who have existing inventories of assets
similar to those being traded. We analyze how these inventories a⁄ect trade, information
dissemination, and prices. We show that when traders￿initial leverages are moderate, in-
ventories increase price and trade volume (a market ￿run-up￿ ), but when leverages are high,
trade is impossible (a market ￿freeze￿ ). Our analysis predicts a pattern of trade in which
prices and volumes ￿rst increase, and then markets break down. Moreover, the presence
of competing buyers may amplify the increased-price e⁄ect. We discuss implications for
regulatory intervention in illiquid markets.
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James Thompson, and Alexei Tchistyi for their helpful comments. We also thank seminar participants at
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia and conference participants at the AFA meeting, the Finance
Theory Group workshop, the FIRS meeting, the Tel Aviv Finance Conference, the European Economic
Association meetings, the Eastern Finance Association meetings, and the Federal Reserve System Committee
on Financial Structure and Regulation. An earlier draft circulated under the title ￿Why Do Markets Freeze?￿
Any remaining errors are our own. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily
re￿ ect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or of the Federal Reserve System. This paper is
available free of charge at www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/.1 Introduction
Consider the sale of mortgages by a loan originator to a buyer. As widely noted, the originator
has a natural information advantage and knows more about the quality of the underlying
assets than other market participants. One consequence, which has been much discussed,
is that he will attempt to sell only the worst mortgages.1 However, a second important
feature of this transaction has received much less attention. Both the buyer and the seller
may hold signi￿cant inventories of mortgages similar to those being sold, and they may care
about the market valuation of these inventories, which a⁄ects how much leverage they can
take. Consequently, they may care about the dissemination of any information that a⁄ects
market valuations of their inventories. In this paper, we analyze how inventories a⁄ect trade,
information dissemination, and price formation. Our setting applies to the sale of mortgage-
related products, but more broadly, to situations in which the seller has more information
about the value of the asset being traded.
Our main result is that the e⁄ect of inventories on trade depends on the buyer￿ s and
seller￿ s initial leverage. When leverage is moderate, inventories increase price and trade
volume (a market ￿run-up￿ ); but when leverage is high, trade may become impossible (a
market ￿freeze￿ ), and information dissemination ceases. In a dynamic extension, our model
predicts a pattern of trade in which prices and trade volume ￿rst increase, and then markets
break down.
The intuition is as follows. In our setting, the motive for trade is that the buyer values
the asset more than the seller does. Since the seller has an information advantage, a sale
reveals information about the value of the traded asset. This information may be used to
reassess the value of inventoried assets and the amount of leverage that the buyer and seller
can take. To ensure neither agent violates his capital constraint (i.e., that the market value
of each agent￿ s assets is greater than the value of his liabilities), the buyer may need to
1See, for example, Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008); and Downing, Ja⁄ee and Wallace (2009).
1o⁄er a higher price, which increases the market￿ s posterior about the value of the asset,
and hence of inventories. The higher price also increases the probability that the seller will
accept the o⁄er. Hence, both prices and expected trade volume may increase. However,
when the capital constraint is too tight, the buyer can no longer increase the price without
losing money. At this point, trade collapses and market participants learn nothing about
asset values.
It is useful to compare the market freeze result above to that obtained in a standard
lemons problem with gains from trade that are common knowledge, but without inventories
and capital constraints. In this standard problem, trade does not break down completely
as follows. If the buyer o⁄ers a price close to the minimum possible seller valuation, the
information rent he surrenders to the seller is small, and in particular, it is smaller than
the direct gains from trade. Consequently, there is a strictly positive probability that trade
occurs. In contrast, when the buyer or seller is capital constrained and concerned about the
e⁄ect of information revelation on the value of his inventories, there is an additional cost
associated with the seller accepting a low o⁄er, namely that it reveals that the asset￿ s value
is very low, which negatively impacts the buyer￿ s and seller￿ s capital constraints. Because
of this additional cost, trade may break down completely, in the sense that there is zero
probability of trade occurring.2
The notion that market participants adjust their trading behavior with an eye to in￿ uenc-
ing the dissemination of information is most natural when markets are ￿thin.￿Accordingly,
in our baseline model we assume that there is a single potential buyer, who hence enjoys a
monopoly position. Interestingly, our results continue to hold even when markets become
￿thicker,￿in the sense that the number of potential buyers increases. Some of the results
are actually strengthened. In particular, a buyer may be forced to raise his bid not only
because he is leveraged, but also because a competing buyer is leveraged; and he may even
2An alternative explanation for a market freeze in situations in which there are gains from trade involves
Knightian uncertainty; see, e.g., Easley and O￿ Hara (2010).
2be forced to acquire assets at a loss-making price, just to make sure that a competing buyer
does not acquire them at a lower price. The key insight here is that a purchase by one buyer
may lead to the release of information that causes a violation of the capital constraint of
a competing buyer, and this may force the competing buyer to increase the price. In each
of the cases above, competition and capital constraints combine to push the price strictly
higher than would be the case under either competition alone, or a single buyer with a cap-
ital constraint. However, when all buyers are highly leveraged, concerns about inventory
valuation again lead to a market freeze and prevent the dissemination of information about
asset quality, just as in the single-buyer case.
Our baseline results, which are obtained in a static setting with a single round of trade,
are suggestive of a dynamic process in which buyers increase leverage and prices until the
market eventually breaks down. In a dynamic extension of our basic framework, we model
this process explicitly and show that a market freeze may be preceded by a run-up in prices.
This result is interesting because the run-up in prices occurs even though (by assumption)
the underlying fundamentals remain unchanged. In this sense, the run-up shares features of
a ￿bubble.￿In our model, this result re￿ ects the fact that increasing inventories force the
buyer to increase his bid. In particular, when the buyer adds assets to his balance sheet, he
reduces the market value of his existing assets and increases his leverage. This forces him to
bid a higher price in the next trade, or else not bid at all.
We use our model to discuss implications for regulatory intervention in illiquid markets.
On the buyer￿ s side, our analysis highlights the potential role of a large investor unencum-
bered by existing inventories (the government, for example); one implication is that by
purchasing assets, the government may impose a cost on potential buyers who choose not to
trade. On the seller￿ s side, our analysis suggests potential limitations to the standard pre-
scription that sellers should retain a stake in the assets they sell. We also relate the model￿ s
predictions to the freeze in the market for mortgage-backed securities during the recent ￿-
3nancial crisis. Finally, we obtain some new testable implications regarding the relationship
between broker-dealers￿inventories and prices.
As a technical contribution, we show that out of all possible trading mechanisms, the one
that maximizes the payo⁄ of a monopolist buyer with inventories and a capital constraint
is the simple mechanism in which the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er to buy up to
q units of the asset at a price per unit p (the buyer selects both p and q). This result
generalizes a classic result of Samuelson (1984), who analyzes essentially the same setting in
the absence of capital constraints and inventories. Moreover, this result implies there is no
loss in focusing on linear price schedules.
Related literature. Our paper relates to the literature on trade under asymmetric informa-
tion, in which the seller is better informed and the gains from trade are common knowledge
(e.g., Samuelson, 1984). As noted earlier, absent inventories and capital constraints, the
market may partially break down in the sense that there is a positive probability that e¢ -
cient trade does not take place; however, the market does not break down completely, as in
our paper. In addition, absent inventories, the buyer does not increase the price when he
becomes more leveraged.
When there are multiple buyers, the combination of capital constraints and inventories
generates a situation in which the fact that the seller trades with one buyer has externalities
for other buyers. In contrast to existing auction-theoretic papers dealing with externalities
(e.g., Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti, 1996), the externality depends on the price paid,
rather than simply whether another buyer obtains the asset.
Two recent papers obtain periods of no trade in a dynamic lemons problem.3 To do so,
they add the assumption that some noisy information about the asset quality is revealed
(exogenously). In Kremer and Skrzypacz (2007), information is revealed at some future
point in time T and there exists t < T, such that trade ceases on the time interval [t;T]. In
3Also related, in a recent paper, Glode, Green, and Lowery (forthcoming) endogenize the extent of adverse
selection in a static standard lemons problem, showing that ￿rms may overinvest in ￿nancial expertise. The
outcome of this is that if uncertainty increases, the probability of e¢ cient trade is reduced.
4Daley and Green (forthcoming), information is revealed gradually. Instead, we obtain a no
trade result by adding inventories and capital constraints to a standard lemons problem. We
also show that concerns about the value of inventories can increase the probability of trade,
as potential buyers are induced to increase the price. In our setting, trade is always e¢ cient,
and so increasing the price increases welfare. In this sense, our paper di⁄ers from papers
in which price manipulation creates distortions that are suboptimal from a social point of
view.4
Our paper also relates to the literature that explores the link between leverage and trade.
For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) show that high leverage may force ￿rms to sell assets
at ￿re-sale prices, while Diamond and Rajan (2011) show that the prospect of ￿re sales may
lead to a market freeze. In their model, banks do not sell their assets because the gains
from selling are captured by the bank￿ s creditors rather than by the bank￿ s equity holders.
Other papers explore feedback e⁄ects between asset prices and leverage: Low prices reduce
borrowing capacity, and hence asset holdings and prices also; see, e.g., Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997). In contrast, we model a situation in which ￿rms can meet their ￿nancial needs by
staying with the status quo. Therefore, there is no need for ￿re sales or ￿cash in the market￿
pricing, as in Allen and Gale (1994). The only motive for trade in our paper is that the
buyer values the asset more than the seller does, and both agents know this.
In a contemporaneous paper, Milbradt (2012) shows that a trader who is subject to a
mark-to-market capital constraint (i.e., one based on the last trade price rather than on the
actual expected value of the asset) may suspend trade so that losses are not revealed. While
the general idea relates to ours, there are big di⁄erences, including the following. First,
in Milbradt (2012) the price is exogenous, whereas in our setting, the price is endogenous.
This allows us to obtain predictions regarding the relationship between prices, inventories,
and leverage. Second, in Milbradt (2012), trade suspension is bad news, whereas in our
4Examples include Allen and Gale (1992); Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005); Goldstein and Guembel
(2008).
5setting, a market freeze is neither good news nor bad news. The key di⁄erence is that
in Milbradt (2012), the agent who acts strategically to prevent information dissemination
is the informed agent, whereas in our setting, the agent who tries to prevent information
dissemination (the buyer) is uninformed. Third, our results do not depend on a speci￿c
accounting or regulatory regime. Instead, the market value of existing assets is derived from
Bayes￿rule. Our main results continue to hold, however, even if we assume marking to
market. Hence, our model is consistent with the view that marking to market accounting
can cause many of the phenomena discussed earlier, but it also predicts that one would see
qualitatively the same phenomena even without marking to market.
The idea that inventory holdings a⁄ect price-setting behavior relates to market mi-
crostructure papers that study the e⁄ect of market-maker inventories on prices; see, e.g.,
Amihud and Mendelson (1980); Ho and Stoll (1981, 1983). These papers assume symmetric
information and are therefore silent with respect to our main results. Moreover, these papers
predict that as inventories increase, prices fall￿ a prediction that seems inconsistent with the
empirical ￿ndings in Manaster and Mann (1996). In contrast, by interpreting buyers in our
model as market-makers, our model predicts that higher inventories may lead to higher
prices. The reason for the opposite predictions is as follows. In classic inventory models, the
dealer wants to reduce the price when he has more inventories because he is either risk averse
and concerned about future price movements, or else he is not allowed to carry too much
inventory. Instead, in our setting, inventories serve as collateral and higher prices increase
borrowing capacity. Our model also provides a new testable hypothesis, namely that a price
o⁄ered by one dealer may increase when other dealers hold more inventories.
Finally, our paper relates to the literature on equity issuance, in which the issuing ￿rm
cares about the market valuation of its remaining equity.5 However, we do not focus on
signaling. Instead, we show how leverage a⁄ects the bidding strategies of uninformed buyers.
Paper outline. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyzes the simplest case,
5See, for example, Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and Welch (1989).
6in which there is one buyer with inventories, and relates the results to the freeze in the
market for mortgage-backed securities during the recent ￿nancial crisis. Section 4 analyzes
a two-period dynamic extension, while Section 5 analyzes the e⁄ects of competition between
multiple buyers. Section 6 discusses several extensions. Section 7 discusses policy and
empirical implications, and Section 8 concludes. The appendices contain proofs and omitted
details.
2 The Model
In the basic model, there is a risk-neutral buyer and a risk-neutral seller. The value of an
asset is v to the seller and v + ￿ to the buyer, where ￿ > 0 denotes the gains from trade.
The distribution of v is common knowledge, and for simplicity, we assume that v is drawn
from a uniform distribution on [0;1]. The seller knows v. Everyone else is uncertain about
the value of v. Consequently, trade a⁄ects posterior beliefs about v, and hence the market
value of each unit of asset. Since ￿ > 0, trade is always e¢ cient.
In one interpretation, the seller is a loan originator. The gains from trade may re￿ ect the
fact that the buyer has a lower cost than the seller of retaining risky assets on his balance
sheet; for example, the buyer may face lower borrowing costs or less stringent regulation.
Alternatively, the buyer might be a broker-dealer who helps with the matching process
between the seller and other investors, who have higher valuations for the asset.
The seller owns x units of the asset for sale. The buyer has an inventory of M units of
the asset, which he acquired earlier. The buyer also has cash and a short-term debt liability.
The liability net of cash holdings is L, and so the buyer can roll over his liabilities only if
the value of his noncash assets exceeds L. Assume, for simplicity, that the buyer holds only
the asset traded and that the purchase of additional units is ￿nanced out of existing cash
holdings and/or new short-term borrowing.6
6The nature of the result remains if instead of or in addition to holding units of the asset traded, the
buyer holds units of an asset with correlated payo⁄s.
7Speci￿cally, suppose the buyer purchases q additional units at a price per unit p, and let
h denote the ￿value￿of the asset, de￿ned as the expected value of v +￿, conditional on the
trading outcome, using Bayes￿rule. Then the buyer can roll over his debt if
h(M + q) ￿ L + pq, (1)
where M + q is the buyer￿ s total inventory of assets net of trade, and L + pq is the buyer￿ s
total liabilities, net of trade. We refer to equation (1) as the buyer￿ s ￿capital constraint.￿
Implicit here is that the threat of loosing the asset induces the buyer to pay his obligations,
and so the capital constraint is based on the value of the asset to the buyer. Alternatively,
the capital constraint might be based on the value of the asset to creditors, and so may not
re￿ ect the gains from trade, or may re￿ ect lower gains from trade. To handle both cases,
we solve in Appendix D, the more general case in which h is the expected value of v + ￿￿,
for some ￿ 2 [0;1]; the nature of the results remains. We also discuss the generalization
in which h is replaced with ￿h, re￿ ecting constraints on the buyer￿ s ability to pledge all
his future cash ￿ ows (See Section 6.2); and in Section 6.3, we discuss the case in which the
capital constraint is based on a technical accounting rule, ￿marking to market,￿under which
h is not derived from Bayes rule, but instead equals the price of the last transaction. For
use below, we refer to h as the ￿market value￿of the asset.
If the buyer violates his capital constraint, he defaults and incurs a cost, which represents
lost growth opportunities due to bankruptcy or closure by a regulator. We focus on the case in
which the capital constraint is satis￿ed before trading begins (i.e, when q = 0 and h = 1
2+￿,
so assets are evaluated at the prior). This assumption allows us to focus on the question of
how the buyer changes his behavior to avoid violating the capital constraint, rather than on
the much-studied ￿re sales that follow when the constraints are violated. We also assume
that the cost of violating the constraint is su¢ ciently high so that the buyer￿ s ￿rst priority
is to satisfy his constraint.7 Hence, the buyer￿ s objective is to maximize the expected pro￿ts
7For example, for the results in Section 3, it is enough to assume that the cost of violating the constraint
is at least x(1 + ￿).
8from buying the asset subject to not violating his capital constraint.8
Finally, we assume that the quantity of the asset available for trade is small relative to
the buyer￿ s existing asset holdings, speci￿cally:
Assumption 1 x < M
Assumption 1 implies that the buyer￿ s capital constraint is tightened when the seller
accepts his o⁄er (see discussion preceding Lemma 1 below). It also implies that increasing
the bid loosens the buyer￿ s capital constraint (see discussion preceding equation (3)).
We model trade by using a variant of the seminal Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model of
price-setting in markets with asymmetric information, in which the uninformed party (the
market-maker in their model, here the buyer) posts a ￿bid￿price at which he is prepared to
buy. We depart from Glosten and Milgrom by ￿rst analyzing the case in which the buyer is a
monopolist and then modeling the e⁄ects of competition between multiple strategic buyers;
in both cases, we assume that the seller is not subject to any capital constraints. In Section
6.1, we show that the basic result extends to the case in which the seller is capital constrained
and must retain some fraction of his assets on his balance sheet.
3 A Monopolist Buyer
Formally, when the buyer is a monopolist the variant of the Glosten-Milgrom setting that we
use to study price formation is as follows. The monopolist buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it
o⁄er to buy up to q 2 [0;x] units of the asset at a price per unit p. The seller responds
by choosing a quantity q0 2 [0;q] to sell, so as to maximize his pro￿ts q0 (p ￿ v).9 In other
words, the buyer o⁄ers a linear price schedule.
As a preliminary, we note that in the monopolist case there is no loss of generality to
assuming that the buyer o⁄ers a linear price schedule: he cannot increase his pro￿ts by
8From the law of iterated expectations, the value of inventoried assets equals its prior and hence does not
enter the objective function.
9When v = p, and hence the seller is indi⁄erent, we assume he picks q0 = q.
9instead o⁄ering a nonlinear schedule. Moreover, a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er of a linear price
schedule is the best bargaining mechanism for the buyer out of all bargaining mechanisms in
which the market observes the ￿nal outcome of the mechanism and only the ￿nal outcome.
This is a generalization of the classic result of Samuelson (1984) to a setting with inventories
and capital constraints; the proof is in Appendix C.10
Proposition 1 A monopolist buyer cannot gain by designing a more complicated bargaining
mechanism (e.g., o⁄ering a nonlinear price schedule).
We start with the benchmark case M = 0, in which the buyer has no inventories. Then
we analyze the main case with inventories, M > 0.
Note that whenever the seller chooses to sell, it is optimal for him to choose q0 = q. In
this case, we say that the seller accepts the buyer￿ s o⁄er; otherwise (if q0 = 0), we say that
the seller rejects the o⁄er. To ensure that the seller￿ s acceptance decision is nontrivial, we
assume that the gains from trade are not too high, ￿ < 1
2, so that the buyer always o⁄ers
to pay p < 1.11
3.1 Buyer Does Not Have Inventories
In the benchmark case, the buyer o⁄ers a price-quantity pair (p;q) to maximize his expected
pro￿ts subject to q ￿ x. The seller accepts the o⁄er if and only if v ￿ p, which happens with
probability p, since v is uniform on [0;1]. Conditional on the seller accepting the o⁄er, the
expected value of the asset to the buyer is 1
2p+￿. Since the buyer pays p, his expected pro￿t
per unit bought is ￿ ￿ 1
2p. Taking into account the probability of trade and the quantity
traded, the buyer￿ s expected pro￿t is ￿ (p;q) ￿ pq(￿ ￿ 1
2p). The buyer￿ s pro￿t-maximizing
bid is to buy everything, q = x, for a price p = ￿.
10Our proof does not rely on a uniform distribution for v; the exact details are in Appendix C. Also note
that as is standard in the mechanism design literature, we assume that the buyer can commit to using the
mechanism he has chosen.
11O⁄ering p ￿ 1 is suboptimal, since the seller always accepts the o⁄er and the buyer obtains an asset
with an expected value of 1
2 + ￿ < 1.
10Proposition 2 In the benchmark case of no inventories, M = 0, the buyer o⁄ers to buy x
units at a price per unit ￿. The seller accepts this o⁄er if and only if v ￿ ￿.
For use below, observe that any p 2 [0;2￿] gives the buyer nonnegative pro￿ts. Conse-
quently, the buyer has room to increase his bid beyond the benchmark price ￿ while still
maintaining positive pro￿ts. These positive pro￿ts stem from the fact that the buyer makes
the o⁄er and so has some bargaining power.
3.2 Buyer Cares About the Value of His Inventory
As before, the seller accepts the buyer￿ s o⁄er if and only if v ￿ p. Accepted o⁄ers reduce the
market value of the asset and hence of existing inventories. However, the purchase of new
units of asset may generate a pro￿t. On net, these two forces tighten the capital constraint,
since, by Assumption 1, inventories are large relative to new trades.
Lemma 1 The acceptance of an o⁄er tightens the capital constraint.
In contrast, the rejection of an o⁄er relaxes the capital constraint since it increases the
market value of the asset. Hence, it is enough to ensure that the capital constraint is
satis￿ed after an o⁄er is accepted. In this case, the market value of the asset drops to
h = E[vjv ￿ p] + ￿ = 1




p + ￿)(M + q) ￿ pq ￿ L. (2)
Hence, the buyer￿ s problem reduces to maximizing the expected pro￿t from his trade,
￿ (p;q), subject to his capital constraint (2). In cases of indi⁄erence, we assume that the buyer
makes the bid associated with the highest quantity q, thereby maximizing social welfare.
De￿ne ￿ ￿ L
( 1
2+￿)M, a measure of the buyer￿ s initial leverage (i.e., the ratio of his net
liabilities to the initial market valuation of his assets). Since q ￿ x < M (Assumption 1),
the buyer￿ s capital constraint (2) can be rewritten as
p ￿







11where p(q) is the minimum price that the buyer must o⁄er to keep his capital constraint
satis￿ed if the seller accepts the o⁄er. In other words, increasing p loosens the capital
constraint. Increasing the price increases the market value of existing inventories, which
helps loosen the capital constraint, but it also increases the amount the buyer pays for the
additional units he purchases, which tightens the capital constraint. When the amount of
inventories is large relative to the amount for sale (Assumption 1), the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates.
Buying more assets also loosens the capital constraint. This follows from the assumption
that the buyer can borrow against the full value of his assets. Formally, since the buyer
makes nonnegative pro￿ts, we know p ￿ 2￿, and so the left-hand side of equation (2) is
increasing in q. Consequently, if the buyer ￿nds it worthwhile to bid at all, he bids for the
entire quantity available, q = x. Bidding for a lower quantity not only lowers the buyer￿ s
pro￿ts, but it also makes it harder to satisfy his capital constraint. In Section 6.2, we show
that if the buyer can borrow only against a fraction of the market value of his assets, it may
no longer be the case that increasing q loosens the capital constraint. In this case, we may
obtain an interior solution in which the buyer o⁄ers to buy less than the full amount.
The buyer￿ s problem reduces to choosing p to maximize his expected pro￿ts ￿ (p;x),
such that p ￿ p(x). Since the buyer loses money from bids p > 2￿, trade is impossible if
p(x) > 2￿, which reduces to ￿ > 4￿
1+2￿. If instead ￿ ￿ 4￿
1+2￿, the buyer bids as close to his
benchmark bid of ￿ as possible; that is, p = maxf￿;p(x)g
Proposition 3 When the buyer cares about the value of his inventories, trade can happen
if and only if leverage is low, i.e., ￿ ￿ 4￿
1+2￿. In this case, the buyer o⁄ers to buy x units at
a price per unit maxf￿;p(x)g.
When the buyer￿ s initial leverage is low, the price and the probability of trade are the
same as in the benchmark case because the buyer has enough slack to satisfy his capital
constraint even though purchasing assets tightens it. When leverage increases, so that the
buyer has less slack, the buyer must increase his bid to ensure that his capital constraint is
12satis￿ed if the seller accepts the o⁄er. Since a higher bid increases the probability that the
seller will accept the o⁄er, the probability of trade increases. Finally, if leverage is too high,
the market breaks down because any bid that is high enough to satisfy the buyer￿ s capital
constraint provides him with negative expected pro￿ts.
We focus on an extreme case in which the buyer has all of the bargaining power, but the
nature of the result remains even if the buyer has only some of the bargaining power. In
particular, the result that, for some parameter values, the price increases in leverage depends
on the fact that in the benchmark case the buyer can capture some of the surplus, and so
when his leverage increases, he can increase the price, while still maintaining positive pro￿ts.
An immediate corollary to Proposition 3 concerns the e⁄ect of high leverage and the
corresponding market breakdown on the revelation of the seller￿ s information about asset
values:
Corollary 1 If initial leverage is high, ￿ > 4￿
1+2￿, market participants learn nothing about
the value v of the asset.
Finally, note that in the analysis above we implicitly assumed that market participants
observe the terms of the buyer￿ s o⁄er only if the o⁄er is accepted and trade actually occurs.
The equilibrium outcomes are exactly the same under the alternative assumption that market
participants observe the o⁄er terms even when the o⁄er is rejected. To see this, note that
rejection of any o⁄er increases the market￿ s expectation about the asset value. Consequently,
if the market observes no trade, the capital constraint is at least weakly slackened. Hence,
the important capital constraint is the one following an accepted o⁄er, which is observed.
3.3 Discussion
Our model implies that socially e¢ cient trade can completely break down (￿freeze￿ ) if the
seller has an information advantage and if the buyer is both highly leveraged and holds
signi￿cant inventories of similar assets. In Section 6.1, we show that trade can also break
13down when the seller is highly leveraged and must retain some assets on his balance sheet.
Our model also has implications for the behavior of prices before the market breaks down.
In particular, in Section 4 below, we show that before the market freezes, we may see a run
up in prices, i.e., a price increase which is not supported by fundamentals.
The predictions above are consistent with the freeze in the markets for mortgage-backed
securities during the recent ￿nancial crisis. Adrian and Shin (2010) document a sharp in-
crease in dealers￿leverage, while many market observers expressed the view that concerns
about the value of inventories induced ￿rms not to sell their assets. For example, an analyst
was quoted in American Banker12 as saying that ￿Other [companies] may be wary of selling
assets for fear of establishing a market-clearing price that could force them to mark down the
carrying value of their nonperforming portfolio.￿Also related is the view expressed in Lewis￿ s
book (2010) that dealers who sold credit default swaps on subprime mortgage bonds did not
make a market in these securities so that information is not revealed and their positions do
not lose money. Moreover, Lewis suggests that prior to the crisis, prices increased in a way
not supported by fundamentals.13
4 Run-ups and breakdowns
The static model is suggestive of a dynamic process in which the buyer increases leverage
and prices until the market breaks down eventually. To model this explicitly, we extend our
single-period model to a two-period model in which the monopolist buyer trades sequentially
with two potential sellers. Each seller sells a di⁄erent asset, and the values of the two assets
are assumed to be independent. Hence, one cannot infer anything about the value of one
12￿Nonperformance Space: Risky Assets Find Market￿(American Banker, August 19, 2009).
13For example, on page 184, Lewis writes that ￿Burry [an investor who bought credit default swaps
on subprime mortgage bonds] sent his list of credit default swaps to Goldman and Bank of America and
Morgan Stanley with the idea that they would show it to possible buyers, so he might get some idea of
the market price. That, after all, was the dealer￿ s stated function: middleman. Market-makers. That is
not the function they served, however. ￿ It seemed the dealers were just sitting on my lists and bidding
extremely opportunistically themselves,￿said Burry. The data from the mortgage servicers was worse every
month...and yet the price of insuring those loans, they said, was falling.￿On page 185, he adds that ￿The
￿rms always claimed that they had no position themselves...but their behavior told him otherwise.￿
14asset by observing trade in the other asset. This allows us to focus only on the e⁄ect of
leverage, which changes endogenously: The outcome of trade with the ￿rst seller a⁄ects the
buyer￿ s leverage before he trades with the second seller. One of our results is that a market
freeze may be preceded by a run-up in prices and increased trade volume.
Speci￿cally, seller i (i = 1;2) sells asset i and can trade only in period i. The value
(per unit) of asset i is vi to the seller and vi + ￿ to the buyer, where v1;v2 are independent
random variables drawn from a uniform distribution on [0,1]. Each seller can sell at most x
units. Before trading begins, the buyer has inventories of M units of asset 1 and M units of
asset 2. In the ￿rst period, the buyer makes an o⁄er (p1;q1) to the ￿rst seller, who can either
accept or reject the o⁄er, and in the second period, the buyer makes an o⁄er (p2;q2) to the
second seller, who can also either accept or reject it.14 In each period, the market observes
the buyer￿ s o⁄er and the seller￿ s response.15 For simplicity, we assume that the discount rate
equals zero.16




; that is, if the buyer o⁄ers to buy something, he must buy
at least q > 0 units. This assumption has no substantive e⁄ect on the results in the previous
sections and is made to avoid an open set problem, as explained below. The parameter q
can be made arbitrarily small.
Since the parameters in each period are the same, it is suboptimal to delay o⁄ers; if it is
suboptimal to make an o⁄er in the ￿rst period, it is also suboptimal to make an o⁄er in the
second period. Thus, a bidding strategy can be summarized by (p1;q1;pa;qa;pr;qr), where
(p1;q1) denotes the o⁄er to the ￿rst seller, and (pa;qq);(pr;qr) denote the o⁄er to the second
seller given that the ￿rst seller accepted or rejected the o⁄er, respectively. The ￿rst seller
14As before, whenever seller i trades, it is optimal for him to choose to sell either 0 or qi, even if he can
choose any quantity q0
i 2 [0;qi]. To simplify the exposition, we exclude q0
i from the strategy space.
15As before, the results in the two-period model remain if the market observes only the terms of accepted
o⁄ers, but not those of rejected o⁄ers.
16As before, the capital constraint is initially satis￿ed and the cost of violating it is su¢ ciently high to
outweigh any pro￿t gains obtained from doing so. Also as before, x < M and ￿ 2 (0;1=2).
15accepts the buyer￿ s o⁄er with probability p1. Hence, the buyer￿ s expected pro￿ts are
￿(p1;q1) + p1￿(pa;qa) + (1 ￿ p1)￿(pr;qr). (4)
As in the previous section, accepted o⁄ers tighten the capital constraint, while rejected o⁄ers
relax the constraint. The potentially binding constraints are as follows:
The capital constraint must be satis￿ed if the ￿rst seller accepts the buyer￿ s o⁄er. For




p1 + ￿)(M + q1) + (
1
2
+ ￿)M ￿ L + p1q1, (5)
and for the case in which the buyer makes a second o⁄er (i.e., pa;qa > 0) and this second




p1 + ￿)(M + q1) + (
1
2
pa + ￿)(M + qa) ￿ L + p1q1 + paqa. (6)
In both cases, the market value of the ￿rst asset is 1
2p1 + ￿. In the ￿rst case, the market
value of the second asset remains at its prior (1
2 + ￿), while in the second case the market
value of the second asset drops to 1
2pa +￿. Note that since constraint (6) implies constraint
(5) (by Lemma 1), requiring that the capital constraint be satis￿ed at the end of the second
period is equivalent to requiring that it be satis￿ed after every period.
The capital constraint must also be satis￿ed if the ￿rst seller rejects the o⁄er. In this
case, the capital constraint is loosened after the ￿rst period, and the potentially binding








p1 + ￿)(M) + (
1
2
pr + ￿)(M + qr) ￿ L + prqr. (7)
The problem reduces to ￿nding a bidding strategy that maximizes the buyer￿ s expected prof-
its such that if pa;qa = 0, constraints (5) and (7) are satis￿ed, and if pa;qa > 0, constraints
(6) and (7) are satis￿ed.
16It turns out that whenever the buyer￿ s ￿rst-period o⁄er p1 is rejected, his capital con-
straint becomes su¢ ciently slack that he can make his unconstrained optimal bid of (￿;x)
in the second period. The intuition is that the ￿rst-period o⁄er p1 can satisfy constraint (5)
only if p1 is high, or the capital constraint is very slack to begin with. In either case, the
buyer￿ s capital constraint has a lot of slack if the ￿rst o⁄er is rejected; therefore, the buyer
can set his second o⁄er equal to the benchmark o⁄er (￿;x).
Lemma 2 If p1 > 0, then (pr;qr) = (￿;x).
It remains to characterize (p1;q1) and (pa;qa). It follows from Proposition 3 that in the
second period the buyer o⁄ers to buy either everything or nothing and makes nonnegative
pro￿ts; hence, we can assume, without loss of generality, that qa = x, with the interpretation
that pa = 0 corresponds to not making an o⁄er.
In contrast, it is sometimes in the buyer￿ s interest to make a loss-making o⁄er of a very
high price in the ￿rst period. The advantage of doing so is that if this high o⁄er is rejected,
the market valuation of the buyer￿ s inventory rises to a commensurately high level, relaxing
the buyer￿ s capital constraint. This allows the buyer to make a highly pro￿table o⁄er in the
second period. The buyer would like the loss-making ￿rst-period o⁄er to be for the smallest
quantity that still gives rise to the increase in market valuation￿ this quantity is q in our
notation.
Our main result in this section is:
Proposition 4 (i) When leverage is low, the buyer makes the benchmark bid (￿;x) in both
periods.
(ii) When leverage is intermediate, the buyer o⁄ers to pay strictly more than the bench-
mark in the ￿rst period, and if the ￿rst o⁄er is accepted, the buyer o⁄ers to pay even more
in the second period (i.e., pa > p1 > ￿); in both periods the buyer bids for the maximum
amount x.
17(iii) When leverage is high, the buyer withdraws from the market in the second period (i.e.,
pa = 0) if his ￿rst o⁄er is accepted. The buyer￿ s initial bid (p1) is increasing in leverage.
In particular, when initial leverage is su¢ ciently high, the buyer initially bids more than the
benchmark; that is, the market freeze is preceded by high prices. The quantity the buyer bids
for in the ￿rst period is decreasing in leverage.
(iv) When leverage is very high, trade completely breaks downs.
Proposition 4 captures a few aspects of a dynamic behavior. If initial leverage is relatively
moderate, the buyer has enough slack in his capital constraint to make two rounds of o⁄ers.
But unless leverage is very low, the buyer still needs to consider his capital constraint, and
this leads him to bid more than the benchmark price in both periods. If his ￿rst bid is
accepted, his capital constraint is tightened, forcing him to bid even more in the second
period. In other words, the price at which trade occurs rises with successful trades.
If instead initial leverage is high, the buyer has insu¢ cient slack to have two bids accepted.
Thus, there must be a period in which trade does not occur. In particular, if the buyer￿ s ￿rst
period o⁄er is accepted, his capital constraint becomes too tight to make a bid in the second
period and so the market freezes. The proposition also sheds light on the price path leading
up to this market freeze. When initial leverage is su¢ ciently high, the capital constraint is
binding, forcing the buyer to make a high bid in the ￿rst period. Thus, the market freeze
may be preceded by a run-up in prices.
When leverage is high, and part (iii) of Proposition 4 applies, the quantity the buyer
o⁄ers to buy in the ￿rst period is decreasing in leverage. Within this range, if leverage is
relatively low, the buyer o⁄ers to buy the full amount to maximize his expected pro￿ts in the
￿rst period. If instead leverage is relatively high, the buyer o⁄ers to buy the lowest amount
possible, since as we explained earlier, if the o⁄er is accepted, he loses money and the only
purpose of the o⁄er is to relax his capital constraint if the o⁄er is rejected.
185 Competition Among Buyers
Up till now we have focused on the case of a single buyer. As we have shown, concerns
about preserving the market value of existing asset inventories a⁄ect the pattern of trade.
When the buyer is very leveraged and so his capital constraint has little slack, such concerns
lead to a trade breakdown and prevent the dissemination of information about asset quality.
However, if the buyer is only moderately leveraged, these same concerns drive up both prices
and trade volumes.
A natural question is how these results are a⁄ected by the presence of multiple competing
buyers. One might conjecture that when multiple buyers are present, it is hard for any
individual buyer to prevent the dissemination of information about asset values. In this
section, we show that this conjecture is only partially correct. When all competing buyers
are very leveraged, concerns about the market value of inventories again lead to a trade
breakdown and prevent the dissemination of information about asset quality. However,
under some circumstances in which one buyer is more leveraged than another, competition
does indeed force trade and price dissemination to occur, even though the most leveraged
buyer expects to lose money if his o⁄er is accepted. In this sense, competition actually
strengthens our previous ￿nding that inventories may drive up prices: now, inventories of
one buyer drive up the price o⁄ered by a second buyer.
Put slightly di⁄erently, the combination of capital constraints and inventories generates a
situation where one buyer￿ s bid has externalities for other buyers. Moreover, and in contrast
to existing auction-theoretic papers dealing with externalities,17 the externality depends on
the price paid, rather than simply whether another buyer obtains the asset.
To simplify exposition, we focus on the case of two buyers. Buyer i has an inventory of
Mi units of the asset and a debt liability Li. The gain from trade with buyer i is ￿i. The
seller has x units for sale. Everything is common knowledge, except for the true value of
17See, for example, Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti (1996).
19the asset (v), which is private information to the seller. As before, the capital constraint for
each buyer is initially satis￿ed, the cost for violating it is large, ￿i 2 (0; 1
2), and the amount
for sale is small relative to the buyer￿ s existing inventories, x < Mi.
Both buyers make o⁄ers simultaneously. Buyer i o⁄ers a price and a quantity (pi;qi),
meaning that he is willing to buy up to qi units at a price per unit pi. The seller selects
quantities q0






2 ￿ x. Hence, if v > maxfp1;p2g, the seller rejects both o⁄ers and trade does not take
place. Otherwise, the seller accepts the o⁄er with the highest price; and if he has remaining
assets to sell, he also accepts the lowest price o⁄er if v ￿ minfp1;p2g.18 The equilibrium
outcomes discussed in this section (in particular, in Lemma 4 and in Propositions 5 and 6),
remain even if a buyer can deviate by o⁄ering a nonlinear price schedule rather than a linear
schedule; the proof, which extends that of Proposition 1, is in Appendix E.19
Parallel to the monopolist case, and in particular (3), de￿ne pi (q) as the minimum price
that satis￿es buyer i￿ s capital constraint given that he o⁄ers to buy quantity q, and buyer
￿i makes no o⁄er. By continuity, de￿ne pi (0) = limq!0 pi (q). Just as in the monopolist
buyer case, pi (￿) is increasing in buyer i￿ s leverage. Recall that a monopolist buyer makes
an o⁄er if and only if his leverage is low enough that pi (x) ￿ 2￿i.
As in Section 4, to avoid technical issues we assume that the minimum quantity a buyer
can o⁄er to buy is q, i.e., qi 2 f0g\[q;x]. To avoid technical issues associated with continuous-
action games, we also assume that the price space is ￿nite, and the values fpi(x);pi(x) ￿
";pi(x) + ";2￿i;2￿i ￿ ";2￿i + "gi2f1;2g lie within this space. The ￿tick￿size " is assumed
to be close to zero, and for clarity, we exclude it from the statements of the results.
Because of the externalities generated by each buyer￿ s bid on other buyers, there are
typically Nash equilibria in which buyer i makes a bid that will violate buyer ￿i￿ s capital
18If prices coincide, p1 = p2, the seller splits his trade between the buyers in proportion to the quantities
q1 and q2; i.e., the seller￿ s trade with buyer 2 is a fraction
q2
q1 of his trade with buyer 1.
19Attar, Mariotti, and SalaniØ (2011) analyze a similar setting, but without inventories and capital con-
straints.
20constraint and forces buyer ￿i to make a higher bid himself. However, not all equilibria of
this type are robust, in the sense that there is no good reason for buyer i to make such a
bid in the ￿rst place. Accordingly, we focus on equilibria that are robust in the sense of
not entailing dominated strategies. Speci￿cally, we characterize equilibria that survive the
following iterated process of elimination of weakly dominated strategies. In the ￿rst stage
we eliminate all strategies that are weakly dominated. In the second stage, we consider the
game remaining after the ￿rst stage and eliminate strategies that are weakly dominated in
this new game. And so on. Lemma 3 characterizes o⁄ers that survive the ￿rst elimination
round.
Lemma 3 (First elimination round) (A) If pi (x) < 2￿i, an o⁄er (pi;qi) survives the
￿rst round of elimination of weakly dominated strategies if and only if maxf￿i;pi (x)g ￿
pi < 2￿i and qi = x.
(B) If pi (x) = 2￿i, the unique o⁄er to survive the ￿rst round of elimination of weakly
dominated strategies is (pi;qi) = (2￿i;x).
(C) If pi (x) > 2￿i, the o⁄ers pi = 0 and (pi;qi) = (pi (x);x) survive the ￿rst round of
elimination of weakly dominated strategies. In contrast, any o⁄er (pi;qi) with pi ￿ pi(0) and
pi 6= pi (x) is eliminated.
Part (A) says that when a buyer has a pro￿table trade, he always tries to exploit it by
making an o⁄er that yields positive pro￿ts and does not violate his capital constraint. This
behavior is similar to the single-buyer case previously analyzed. The result in part (C) that
the loss-making o⁄er (pi (x);x) is undominated re￿ ects the fact that, with competition, a
buyer may wish to make a ￿preemptive￿ bid to ensure that his capital constraint is not
violated should the other buyer make an o⁄er at a low price.
215.1 Equilibrium When Inventories Do Not Matter
We start with the benchmark case in which neither buyer is subject to a capital constraint.
For ease of exposition, we assume in the main text that the two buyers have relatively
similar valuations and state all results under this assumption. The appendix contains general
statements of all results, which do not rely on this assumption.
Speci￿cally, we assume that maxf￿1;￿2g ￿ minf2￿1;2￿2g. In this case the buyer
with the highest valuation acquires the asset at a price determined by the buyer with the
second-highest valuation, and the equilibrium price is minf2￿1;2￿2g; this is a standard
outcome for settings with public buyer valuations.20 This result generalizes easily to the
case in which both buyers have low leverage, so that their capital constraints are not binding
in equilibrium.
Lemma 4 If both buyers have low leverage, i.e., maxfp1 (x);p2 (x)g ￿ minf2￿1;2￿2g,
then the only equilibrium outcome that survives iterated elimination of weakly dominated
strategies is that whenever the seller agrees to sell, he sells everything to the buyer with the
higher valuation for a price minf2￿1;2￿2g.
5.2 Equilibrium When Inventories Matter
We start with the case in which at least one of the two buyers has a low-enough leverage
such that he would acquire the asset if he were the only buyer. Without loss of generality,
let this buyer be buyer 1; formally, p1 (x) ￿ 2￿1.
From Lemma 3, we know that buyer 1 bids for the full amount x and that the bid-price p1
per unit is below 2￿1. The key observation is that if p1 < p2(0), and the seller accepts buyer
1￿ s o⁄er, the expected value of v drops to
p1
2 , and this causes buyer 2￿ s capital constraint to
be violated. Consequently, when buyer 2 is highly leveraged, so p2(0) is high, buyer 2 may
bid more aggressively to ensure that the seller does not accept a lower bid from buyer 1.
20See, for example, Ho and Stoll (1983).
22Our main result is:
Proposition 5 Assume p1 (x) ￿ 2￿1. Then the only equilibrium outcome that survives
iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies is as follows:
(A) If buyer 2 has both low leverage and low valuation relative to buyer 1, i.e., maxf￿2;p2 (0)g
￿ maxf￿1;p1 (x)g, then whenever the seller agrees to sell, he sells everything for price
maxfp1 (x);minf2￿1;2￿2gg . In particular, if p1 (x) > 2￿2, buyer 1 acquires the asset at
price p1 (x), which increases in his leverage.
(B) Otherwise, whenever the seller agrees to sell, he sells everything for price
maxfp2 (x);minf2￿1;2￿2gg. In particular, if p2 (x) 2 (2￿2;2￿1), the seller sells every-
thing to buyer 1 at price p2 (x) and if p2 (x) ￿ maxf2￿1;2￿2g, the seller sells everything to
buyer 2 who makes negative pro￿ts.
Recall that in the benchmark case without capital constraints, the equilibrium price is
minf2￿1;2￿2g. In part (A), capital constraints interact with competition in a straightfor-
ward way: when buyer 1￿ s capital constraint is relatively tight, it forces him to increase his
o⁄er to p1 (x).
In part (B), in contrast, the interaction between capital constraints and competition is less
straightforward and can lead to a form of ￿spillover￿of capital constraints. That is, if buyer
2￿ s leverage is relatively high so that p2 (x) 2 (2￿2;2￿1), buyer 2￿ s capital constraint leads
him to compete more aggressively with buyer 1, and consequently buyer 1 ends up paying an
amount p2 (x) that is determined by buyer 2￿ s capital constraint. If p2 (x) ￿ maxf2￿1;2￿2g,
buyer 1 can no longer compete; therefore, whenever trade occurs, buyer 2 acquires everything
at a price p2 (x). In the latter case, buyer 2 makes negative pro￿ts, even though he would
not bid at all if he were the only buyer. Buyer 2 is forced to make this bid, since otherwise
the seller trades with buyer 1 and buyer 2￿ s capital constraint is violated.
It is worth contrasting this last result, in which competition induces buyer 2 to bid when
he would otherwise have exited the market, with the existing literature on nonexclusive
23contracting. In this literature,21 latent o⁄ers deter entry. In contrast, in our setting, latent
o⁄ers induce entry: buyer 2 enters precisely because of buyer 1￿ s latent o⁄er.
Finally, consider the case in which both buyers are so leveraged, that, if bidding indi-
vidually, trade collapses in the sense that no one makes an o⁄er. Clearly, no trade is an
equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies, since given
that one buyer is unwilling to make an o⁄er, the unique best response for the other buyer
is also not to make an o⁄er. Moreover, no trade is the only outcome to survive iterated
elimination of weakly dominated strategies when p1 (x) 6= p2 (x).22
Proposition 6 If both buyers are highly leveraged (i.e., pi (x) > 2￿i for i 2 f1;2g), then
a no-trade equilibrium survives iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. When
p1 (x) 6= p2 (x), this is the unique equilibrium that survives iterated elimination.
Proposition 6 shows that when both buyers have tight capital constraints, the conclusions
of the single-buyer case continue to hold: trade collapses, and price dissemination stops.
Indeed, the condition pi (x) > 2￿i in Proposition 6 is equivalent to the condition for no
trade (￿i >
4￿i
1+2￿i) in Proposition 3.
6 Extensions
6.1 Seller Cares About the Value of His Inventory
In the analysis so far, we assume that the buyer is capital constrained, but the seller is
not. A similar intuition applies when the seller is capital constrained. In particular, a seller
close to his capital constraint may not accept an o⁄er p that exceeds the true value v of the
asset, because acceptance reduces the market value of his assets from the ex ante value 1
2
21See, for example, Bisin and Guaitoli (2004), who study a moral hazard environment; and Attar, Mariotti,
and SalaniØ (2011), and Ales and Maziero (2011), who study an adverse selection environment.
22In the nongeneric case p1 (x) = p2 (x) > maxfp1 (0);p2 (0)g, we cannot rule out other equilibria in which
one buyer makes a ￿latent￿o⁄er, knowing that it will not be accepted in equilibrium, and the second buyer
makes a ￿loss making￿o⁄er to rule out a situation in which the seller trades with the ￿rst buyer and the
capital constraint of the second buyer is violated.
24to
p
2. In words, the seller￿ s trading decision is distorted by the seller￿ s desire to prevent the
dissemination of bad news.
More formally, suppose the seller has a stock of Ms assets and is able to sell a maximum
x ￿ Ms. For example, regulatory requirements may force the seller to retain Ms￿x assets on
his balance sheet; or Ms ￿x of the assets may be much more valuable to the seller than the
buyer, so that the gains from trade ￿ exist only on x of the assets. For ease of exposition,
we analyze the case in which the seller is constrained and the buyer is not. We denote the
seller￿ s liabilities by Ls and de￿ne ￿s ￿ Ls
1
2Ms, which is a measure of the seller￿ s initial leverage.
Similar to before, we assume the seller￿ s capital constraint is satis￿ed initially and that the
cost of violating it is very high.
The potentially binding constraint is when the seller accepts the buyer￿ s o⁄er. In this
case, the market learns that E(v) = 1
2p, and the seller￿ s capital constraint becomes
1
2
p(Ms ￿ q) + pq ￿ Ls, (8)
where Ms ￿ q is the seller￿ s total inventory net of trade and pq is the sale proceeds. Note
that the seller￿ s capital constraint is based on the value of asset to the seller and so does not







The seller accepts the buyer￿ s o⁄er if and only if v ￿ p and the o⁄er satis￿es the capital
constraint. Hence, the buyer￿ s problem reduces to choosing an o⁄er (p;q) such that equation
(9) is satis￿ed. As in the buyer￿ s case, it is optimal for the buyer to o⁄er either q = 0 or
q = x, which leads us to Proposition 7.
Proposition 7 When only the seller cares about the value of his inventory, trade can occur
if and only if leverage is su¢ ciently low, i.e., ￿s ￿ 2￿(1+ x
Ms). In this case, the buyer o⁄ers




25The relationship between leverage, prices and probability of trade is similar to the rela-
tionship we obtained earlier for the case in which the buyer was capital constrained. The
seller￿ s case also provides several predictions regarding Ms￿x, the assets that the seller must
retain. Trade can happen only if Ms ￿ x is su¢ ciently low. However, once trade happens,
a further reduction in Ms ￿ x reduces the probability of trade. Intuitively, when retained
assets Ms ￿ x decrease, the market value of these retained assets has a less important role.
This means that the market is less likely to break down, but it also means that if trade
happens, the buyer does not need to increase the price as much to satisfy the seller￿ s capital
constraint, and so the probability of trade is reduced.
Finally, the analysis above treats Ms ￿ x of the assets as absolutely unavailable for sale.
If instead the buyer could purchase them even though there are no immediate gains from
trade, we conjecture that under some circumstances he might be willing to do so, in order to
relax the seller￿ s capital constraint and obtain a better price on the x assets he really wants
to buy.
6.2 Limited Borrowing Capacity
What if the buyer and seller can borrow against only a fraction of the market value of
their assets, as opposed to the full value as we have thus far assumed? The analysis of the
one-period case is easily extended to capture this. Replace h in the capital constraint with
￿h, where ￿ is a constant, such that ￿ 2 (0;1]. The parameter ￿ represents ￿haircuts￿set
by a regulator or by potential lenders to account for the asset￿ s risk. Alternatively, ￿ < 1
represents limitations on the ability of potential lenders to seize borrowers￿assets. Our basic
results are qualitatively unchanged by the possibility of haircuts; in addition, we obtain a
couple of new results (Appendix D contains the details).
First, the comparative static in ￿ sheds light on the e⁄ects of government interventions.
Increases in ￿ increase the region in which trade can happen. Thus, a regulator might be
able to defrost the market by reducing capital requirements or providing loan guarantees,
26as both increase ￿. However, once ￿ is large enough so that trade can occur, but not too
large so that the benchmark solution is not achieved, a further increase in ￿ reduces the bid
price and the probability of trade. Intuitively, a higher ￿ increases the borrowing capacity
of existing assets and therefore has a similar e⁄ect to that of reducing initial leverage.
The case ￿ < 1 also provides some new results in the buyer￿ s case. First, the quantity
o⁄ered is continuous in leverage and as leverage increases, the quantity gradually drops from
the full amount x to zero. Second, expected volume, q Pr(v ￿ p), is continuous in leverage.
It ￿rst rises and then drops gradually to zero. The initial increase in expected volume occurs
because at moderate levels of leverage, the buyer increases the price but keeps the quantity
unchanged, at q = x. As leverage increases further, the buyer continues to increase the price,
but he also reduces the quantity until it reaches zero.
6.3 Marking to Market
In our main analysis above, we assumed that the market value of assets is derived using
all available information; that is, using Bayes￿rule. However, as we show below, one ob-
tains qualitatively similar results if instead assets are valued based on ￿marked to market￿
accounting; that is, valued at the most recent transaction price. Hence, our model is consis-
tent with the interpretation that marking to market can cause many of the phenomena we
discussed earlier, but it also predicts that one would see qualitatively the same phenomena
even without marking to market accounting.
Denote by p0 the price of the last o⁄er accepted. Under marking to market with a
borrowing capacity ^ ￿ 2 (0;1]; the initial borrowing capacity of each unit of the asset is ^ ￿p0,
and if an o⁄er (p;q) is accepted, the borrowing capacity changes to ^ ￿p. A rejected o⁄er
has no e⁄ect on borrowing capacity. Hence, the relevant capital constraint for the buyer is
^ ￿p(M +q) ￿ L+pq. As before, the buyer￿ s objective is to maximize the pro￿ts from trading
subject to satisfying the capital constraint.
For ease of exposition, consider the case ^ ￿ = 1, so the capital constraint reduces to
27pM ￿ L.23 Denoting the buyer￿ s initial leverage by ￿
0 ￿ L
p0M, the capital constraint becomes
p ￿ ￿
0p0. If leverage is low or intermediate, i.e., 2￿ ￿ ￿
0p0, the buyer o⁄ers to buy x units
at a price per unit maxf￿;￿
0p0g. Otherwise, the buyer does not make any o⁄er. The results
for competing buyers are also similar to those in our previous analysis.24
For the two-period case, the relevant capital constraints, which are the analogues of
equations (5), (6), and (7), are p1M +p0M ￿ L, p1M +paM ￿ L, and p0M +prM ￿ L. Our
previous analysis of the dynamic case reveals that the buyer sometimes makes a high loss-
making bid early on (i.e., date 1) in order to raise market beliefs about the value of the ￿rst
asset and relax his capital constraint. In the case of marking to market, the level of last price
p0 has a big e⁄ect on whether such a strategy is worthwhile. Speci￿cally, o⁄ers p above 2￿
are loss-making, with the expected loss equal to q minfp;1g
￿
p ￿ 1
2 minfp;1g ￿ ￿
￿
, which is
independent of the last price p0; while the extent to which the capital constraint is relaxed
depends on p ￿ p0. So ceteris paribus, a given relaxation of the capital constraint is more
costly when the markets are falling (so the last price p0 was high) than when markets are
rising (so that the last price p0 is low).
Our benchmark analysis also establishes that when the buyer makes a pro￿table o⁄er
in the ￿rst period and his o⁄er is accepted, he either increases the o⁄er price in the second
period, or else stops bidding. This result also continues to hold.25
7 Policy and Empirical Implications
Our analysis has implications for government attempts to defrost markets and for regula-
tory proposals aimed at improving market functioning. It also has empirical implications
regarding the relationship between dealers￿inventories and prices.
23The case ^ ￿ < 1 corresponds to ￿ = 2^ ￿ and ￿ = 0 in our general analysis in Appendix D. Our main
results are qualitatively unchanged by this generalization.
24Denote buyer i￿ s initial leverage by ￿
0
i ￿ Li
p0Mi and replace pi(x) and pi(0) with ￿
0
ip0.
25To see that de￿ne H = L
M and ￿ = p0 in the proof of Proposition 4. (Note that since the capital
constraint is satis￿ed initially (2p0M ￿ L), it follows that p0 > 2￿ whenever the benchmark solution is not
achieved; hence, the interval (4￿;2￿ + ￿), which is discussed in the proof, exists.)
287.1 Defrosting Frozen Markets
Consider the case in which only the buyer cares about inventory values and in which trade
has completely broken down; that is, ￿ > 4￿
1+2￿(Proposition 3). The discussion can easily be
extended to the case of more than one buyer, as in Proposition 6.
One option open to a government is to o⁄er to buy the seller￿ s assets. A central question is
whether such government purchases can succeed without taxpayer subsidies (in expectation).
Our model has two implications in this respect. First, if the government faces the same
lemons problem that the potential buyer does, a subsidy-free purchase scheme is possible only
if the asset is worth more to the government than to the seller; formally, if the government￿ s
valuation of the asset is v+￿g, we must have ￿g > 0. Second, even if ￿g > 0, a subsidy-free
purchase scheme imposes a cost on the original buyer, assuming he is a more e¢ cient holder
of the asset than the government (￿g < ￿). Recall that this buyer does not purchase the
asset himself because doing so violates his capital constraint. However, if the government
buys the asset at unsubsidized terms, this also leads to a violation of the buyer￿ s capital
constraint.26 A similar issue arises if the government subsidizes a second private buyer to
purchase the asset.
Another option is to remove assets from the buyer￿ s balance sheet; that is, to replace
assets with cash. If the buyer can borrow against the full value of his assets, as assumed
in our analysis so far, then again, purchasing assets from the buyer can relax his capital
constraint only if the purchase involves a taxpayer subsidy. If instead the buyer has limited
borrowing capacity, as in Section 6.2, purchasing assets from the buyer might relax his capital
constraint even if the purchase does not involve a taxpayer subsidy.27
26Formally, since the market has broken down, we know that p(q) > 2￿, for every q 2 (0;x]; and since
￿g < ￿, it follows that any unsubsidized o⁄er p ￿ 2￿g satis￿es p < 2￿. Therefore, p < p(q) for every
q 2 (0;x], and any unsubsidized o⁄er violates the buyer￿ s capital constraint.
27In particular, if the government plans to spend Zg dollars, it can buy Zg=(1
2 + ￿g) units without a
taxpayer subsidy. Since each of these units allows the buyer to borrow a(1
2 + ￿) dollars, the government
purchase loosens the buyer￿ s capital constraint only if the sale proceeds exceed the assets￿borrowing capacity;




2+￿g. This condition reduces to ￿g > ￿￿ ￿ 1
2(1 ￿ ￿) and can be satis￿ed
even if ￿g < ￿.
297.2 Should Regulation Mandate Some Retention of the Asset by
the Seller?
A commonly voiced regulatory proposal is that sellers of assets subject to asymmetric in-
formation problems, such as issuers of asset-backed securities, should be required to retain
some stake in the assets they sell.28 Our analysis identi￿es a potential cost to this proposal,
namely, that under some circumstances it leads to a market breakdown. To see this, interpret
the parameter x in our model as stemming from a regulation mandating that the seller retain
a fraction Ms￿x
Ms of the asset he is selling. From Proposition 7, whenever x is su¢ ciently low,
trade is impossible because the seller cares too much about the market￿ s perception of the
value of the assets he is forced to retain. Moreover, notice that this case arises more easily
when the seller is highly leveraged (measured by ￿s).
The goal that regulators appear to have in mind with this regulation is to reduce moral
hazard on the part of asset sellers; for example, to discourage loan originators from making
bad loans and/or shirking on monitoring later on. Our analysis does not speak to this issue,
and it seems likely that the regulation will have its intended e⁄ect in this regard. Our point
here is instead to draw attention to a potentially signi￿cant cost of this regulation, namely,
that it can lead to the breakdown of socially e¢ cient trade.
7.3 Dealers￿Inventories and Prices
A further implication of our analysis is that prices are increasing in inventory levels. In-
tuitively, larger inventories make buyers more concerned about the market value of these
inventories, leading them to make higher o⁄ers.
More formally, this result is a corollary of our Proposition 3, which characterizes trade in
the basic (single buyer) version of our model. To see this, observe that the derivative of p(x)
with respect to inventories M has the same sign as 4￿￿￿(1+2￿), which by Proposition 3
is positive whenever trade occurs. Note that here we are characterizing only the direct e⁄ect
28See, for example, section 15G of the Investor Protection and Securities Reform Act of 2010.
30of inventories, in the sense that we are holding leverage ￿ constant. If changes in inventory
levels also a⁄ect leverage, there is an additional indirect e⁄ect on prices; this indirect e⁄ect
reinforces the direct e⁄ect if higher inventories are associated with greater leverage (as seems
likely).
Moreover, the positive relationship between inventories and prices continues to hold when
there are multiple competing dealers. Indeed, by part (B) of Proposition 5, the price o⁄ered
by one buyer may increase when a competing buyer has larger inventories.
As noted in the introduction, this comparative static result has implications for the rela-
tionship between market-maker inventories and prices that is di⁄erent from that produced
by existing models. In particular, existing models generally predict a negative relationship
between market-maker inventories and prices, while our analysis predicts a positive relation-
ship, consistent with the empirical ￿ndings of Manaster and Mann (1996).
8 Summary
We analyze how existing stocks of assets ￿ inventories ￿ a⁄ect trade, information dissemi-
nation, and price formation. When market participants are close to their maximal leverage,
concerns about the revelation of bad news prevents socially bene￿cial trade and information
dissemination. However, when market participants are further from their maximal leverage,
inventories lead to overbidding (in the sense that the buyer pays more than he would like),
which stimulates socially bene￿cial trade. Because trade increases buyer inventories and
often increases buyer leverage, these predictions imply that prices and trade volumes may
￿rst increase before collapsing, as we show formally in the dynamic extension of our basic
model. Our results continue to hold when buyers compete with one another, and some of the
results are even strengthened. We use our model to comment on several prominent policy
questions, and we also derive several new empirical predictions. As a technical contribution,
we generalize a classic result of Samuelson (1984) to cover buyers with capital constraints
31and inventories.
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34Appendix A: Proofs (Monopolist Buyer)
We use the notation ￿ (p) ￿ p(￿ ￿ 1
2p) to denote the buyer￿ s expected pro￿ts per unit.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose the buyer o⁄ers (p;q). The acceptance of this o⁄er has two
e⁄ects: First, the value of existing assets falls from (1
2+￿)M to (1
2p+￿)M, with a net e⁄ect
1
2(1 ￿ p)M > 1
2(1 ￿ p)x. Second, the buyer adds q units, each with a borrowing capacity of
1
2p + ￿, but he also pays p per unit. If pro￿ts 1
2p + ￿ ￿ p are negative, this second e⁄ect is
also negative, and the proof is complete. Otherwise, the added borrowing capacity from this
is (￿￿ 1
2p)q, which is at most 1
2(1￿p)x, since q ￿ x and ￿ < 1
2. Combining the two e⁄ects,
it follows that the overall e⁄ect is negative and the capital constraint is tightened. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. Since choosing (pr;qr) = (￿;x) maximizes second-period pro￿ts, it is
enough to show that the capital constraint is not violated after choosing this o⁄er; that is, we




L+￿x. Since q1 ￿ x, it is enough to show that (1
2 + 1
2p1+￿)M +(3
2￿)(M +q1) ￿ L+￿q1,
which can be rewritten as (1
2p1 +￿)(M +q1)+(1
2 +￿)M + 1
2￿(M ￿q1)+ 1
2p1q1 ￿ L+p1q1.
The last equation follows since the o⁄er (p1;q1) satis￿es equation (5), and since M > x ￿ q1.
Q.E.D.
Lemma A-1 The ￿rst-period o⁄er satis￿es q1 2 f0;q;xg. If q1 = q, expected pro￿ts in the
￿rst period are negative; that is, p1 > 2￿. If q1 = x, expected pro￿ts in the ￿rst period are
nonnegative; that is, p1 ￿ 2￿.
Proof of Lemma A-1. The quantity q1 enters the capital constraint with a coe¢ cient
(1
2p1 +￿)￿p1, which is the expected value of the asset acquired minus the price paid. This
expression has the same sign as the per-unit pro￿t ￿ (p1). Consequently, if the buyer ￿nds
it worthwhile to bid at all, then if ￿ (p1) ￿ 0, he bids for the maximum amount x, since
35doing so relaxes the capital constraint and increases pro￿ts; while if ￿ (p1) < 0, he bids for
the minimum amount q. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. As we show in the text, qa = x, pa ￿ 2￿, and (pr;qr) = (￿;x).
Hence, the buyer￿ s problem reduces to choosing p1;q1;pa that maximize expected pro￿ts (4)
subject to the capital constraint: namely, equation (5) if pa = 0, and equation (6) if pa > 0.




2(M￿x) and H ￿
L￿2￿(M+x)
1
2(M￿x) . Observe that ￿ > 1 > 2￿, and H is
a monotone transformation of the buyer￿ s initial leverage, ￿ = L
( 1
2+￿)2M. In addition, when
q1 = x, equation (5) reduces to p1 ￿ H ￿ ￿.
We ￿rst establish that if H ￿ 2￿ + ￿ (i.e., leverage is not very high), q1 = x. De￿ne
p = maxf￿;H￿￿g. Since o⁄ering (p1;q1) = (p;x) and pa = 0 satis￿es the capital constraint
and provides nonnegative pro￿ts (since H ￿￿ ￿ 2￿), trade can always happen. By Lemma
A-1, it is enough to show that it is suboptimal to choose q1 = q. The proof is by contradiction.
Suppose the optimal bidding strategy is (p1;q1;pa;qa;pr;qr) with q1 = q, so from Lemma
A-1, p1 > 2￿ and the buyer loses money in the ￿rst period. We obtain a contradiction
as follows: If pa = 0, the buyer is better o⁄ choosing the strategy (e p1; e q1; e pa; e qa; e pr; e qr) =
(p;x;pa;qa;pr;qr). The alternate strategy satis￿es the capital constraint (e p1 ￿ H ￿ ￿)
and increases the buyer￿ s expected pro￿ts from q1￿(p1) + (1 ￿ p1)x￿(￿) to x￿(p) + (1 ￿
p)x￿(￿). In particular, the alternate strategy provides nonnegative pro￿ts in the ￿rst period,
and increases the probability that the buyer can make the benchmark bid in the second
period. If instead pa > 0, the buyer is better o⁄ choosing the strategy (e p1; e q1; e pa; e qa; e pr; e qr) =
(pa;qa;p1;q1;pr;qr). Since the original strategy satis￿es the capital constraint, the alternate
strategy also satis￿es it. The alternate strategy also increases the buyer￿ s expected pro￿ts
from q1￿(p1)+p1qa￿(pa)+(1￿p1)x￿(￿) to qa￿(pa)+paq1￿(p1)+(1￿pa)x￿(￿). In particular,
the alternate strategy reduces the probability of obtaining negative pro￿ts and increases the
probability that the buyer can make the benchmark bid in the second period.
Hence, whenever H ￿ 2￿ + ￿, q1 = x and by Lemma A-1, p1 ￿ 2￿. For strategies in
36which pa > 0, the optimal (p1;pa) maximizes expected pro￿ts per unit V (p1;pa) ￿ ￿(p1) +
p1￿(pa)+(1￿p1)￿(￿), subject to the capital constraint (6), which reduces to p1 +pa ￿ H.
For strategies in which pa = 0, the optimal p1 maximizes V (p1;0), subject to p1 ￿ H ￿ ￿.
The benchmark solution p1 = pa = ￿ is achieved if and only if H ￿ 2￿. In contrast, when
H 2 (4￿;2￿ + ￿], it is optimal to choose pa = 0, since otherwise either pa > 2￿, which is
suboptimal, or p1 > 2￿, which violates Lemma A-1 (recall q1 = x). By continuity, there
exist H1;H2 2 (2￿;4￿), such that whenever H 2 (2￿;H1) (i.e., intermediate leverage), it is
optimal to choose pa > 0 and whenever H 2 (H2;2￿+￿) (i.e., higher leverage), it is optimal
to choose pa = 0. In the ￿rst case, the capital constraint (6) is binding because if it is not,
either p1 > ￿ and @V
@p1 = ￿0 (p1)+￿ (pa)￿￿ (￿) < 0, which contradicts the optimality of p1; or
else pa > ￿, which is clearly suboptimal. Hence, p1 maximizes V (p;H￿p), which is cubic in p
with a negative coe¢ cient on the cubic term. To show that pa > p1 > ￿, we need to show that
p1 2 (￿; H
2 ). This result follows if d
dp1V (p1;H ￿ p1)
￿ ￿ ￿
p1=￿
> 0 > d





dp1V (p1;H ￿ p1) = ￿0(p1) + ￿(H ￿ p1) ￿ p1￿0(H ￿ p1) ￿ ￿(￿). Since ￿ is a
quadratic with its maximum at ￿, for any p, ￿(p) = ￿ (￿) + 1
2(p ￿ ￿)￿0(p). Given this,
d







2 (H ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
￿
￿0 (H ￿ ￿),
which is positive. Similarly, d




= (1 ￿ H
2 )￿0(H
2 ) + ￿(H





2 ) = (1 ￿ H=4 ￿ ￿=2)￿0(H=2), which is negative. In the second
case H 2 (4￿;2￿ + ￿], the objective function is quadratic and the optimal solution is
e p1 = maxf￿￿ 1
2￿2;H ￿￿g, which is increasing in H (and hence, in leverage). In particular,
when H > ￿ + ￿, we obtain e p1 > ￿, and so the buyer bids more than the benchmark.
Finally, consider the case H > 2￿ + ￿. If there is trade, we must have p1 > 2￿; that
is, the buyer bids more than the benchmark and loses money. To see that, suppose to
the contrary that p1 ￿ 2￿; then q1 = x (by Lemma A-1), and (p1;q1) violates the capital
constraint (5), which is a contradiction. Hence, by Lemma A-1, q1 2 f0;qg. Next, we
show that pa = 0. To see that, recall that accepted o⁄ers tighten the capital constraint
37(Lemma 1). Therefore, an o⁄er with pa > 0 must satisfy equation (6) when q1 = 0 and
when the ￿rst asset is evaluated at its prior; that is, pa ￿ H ￿ ￿. But then pa > 2￿, which
is suboptimal. Hence, pa = 0, and whenever there is trade, the buyer￿ s expected utility is
q￿(p1) + (1 ￿ p1)x￿(￿). This expression is strictly decreasing in p1 when p1 > 2￿. Thus, if
there is trade, the optimal p1 satis￿es the capital constraint (5) with equality. It then follows







2(M￿q). Observe that H is a monotone transformation of the
buyer￿ s initial leverage.
Combining the results above, we obtain that whenever pa = 0, the initial bid is increasing
in leverage and the quantity o⁄ered in the ￿rst period is decreasing in leverage (from x to
q). To establish that trade breaks down if leverage is too high, observe that if H = 2￿, the
buyer￿ s expected utility is strictly positive, whereas if H = 1, the buyer￿ s expected utility is
strictly negative. Q.E.D
Appendix B: Proofs (Competing Buyers)
Lemma A-2 For every i 2 f1;2g, one of the following is true: (i) pi (￿) ￿ 2￿i; (ii) for all
q 2 [0;x), pi (x) > pi (q) > 2￿i; or (iii) for all q 2 [0;x), pi (x) < pi (q) < 2￿i.
Proof of Lemma A-2. The capital constraint (2) can be written as (1
2p + ￿i)Mi +
q(￿i ￿ 1
2p) ￿ Li: By Assumption 1, the left-hand side is increasing in p, and by de￿n-





Mi = Li. Hence, (i) if pi (0) = 2￿i, the capital constraint is satis￿ed with
equality for any q when pi = 2￿i, and so pi (￿) ￿ 2￿i; (ii) if pi (0) > 2￿i, the capital con-
straint is violated when q = x and p = pi(0), and so pi (x) > pi (0); (iii) if pi (0) < 2￿i, the
capital constraint is slack when q = x and p = pi(0), and so pi (x) < pi (0). The result then
follows from monotonicity of pi (￿) in q. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3. Part (A): From Lemma A-2, pi (x) < pi (q) < 2￿i, for any q 2 [0;x).
Consider an o⁄er (pi;qi). If pi 2 [maxf￿i;pi (x)g;2￿i) and qi = x, the o⁄er (pi;qi) survives
38the ￿rst stage of elimination, since it is a unique best response for buyer i when buyer ￿i bids
p￿i = pi￿". If pi is in this same interval, but qi < x, the o⁄er (pi;qi) is weakly dominated by
the o⁄er (pi;x), since raising the quantity to x weakly increases both buyer i￿ s pro￿ts, with
a strict increase if ￿i￿ s o⁄er is lower, and moreover weakly increases the probability that i￿ s
capital constraint is satis￿ed. Any o⁄er with pi < ￿i is weakly dominated by raising the
o⁄er to ￿i. Finally, if pi ￿ 2￿i or pi < pi (x), the o⁄er (pi;qi) is weakly dominated by the
o⁄er (pi (0);x), as follows. This o⁄er produces positive pro￿ts whenever it is accepted (e.g.,
if p￿i = 0) and guarantees that buyer i￿ s capital constraint is satis￿ed, regardless of ￿i￿ s
o⁄er. In contrast, o⁄ering pi ￿ 2￿i never leads to positive pro￿ts, and o⁄ering pi < pi (x)
violates i￿ s capital constraint for at least some o⁄ers of buyer ￿i (e.g., p￿i = 0).
Part (B): From Lemma A-2, pi (￿) ￿ 2￿i. O⁄ering (2￿i;x) weakly dominates any other
o⁄er (pi;qi): O⁄ering (2￿i;x) produces zero pro￿ts and guarantees that buyer i￿ s capital
constraint is satis￿ed, regardless of ￿i￿ s o⁄er. In contrast, if pi > 2￿i, the o⁄er (pi;qi)
produces negative pro￿ts whenever it is accepted (e.g., if p￿i = 0), and if pi < 2￿i, the o⁄er
violates i￿ s capital constraint for at least some o⁄ers of buyer ￿i (e.g., p￿i = 0).
Part (C): From Lemma A-2, pi (x) > pi (q) > 2￿i for any q 2 [0;x). The o⁄er pi = 0
survives the ￿rst elimination round, since it is the unique best response for buyer i when
buyer ￿i bids p￿i = 0. Speci￿cally, if buyer i bids pi = 0, he obtains zero pro￿ts and
his capital constraint is satis￿ed; if he bids pi > 0 and his o⁄er is accepted, he either
makes negative pro￿ts or his capital constraint is violated. The o⁄er (pi;qi) = (pi (x);x)
survives the ￿rst elimination round, since it is a unique best response when buyer ￿i bids
p￿i 2 (0;pi (0) ￿ "). Speci￿cally, the o⁄er (pi;qi) = (pi (x);x) guarantees that buyer i￿ s
capital constraint is satis￿ed, while if he bids pi < pi (x) or qi < x, his capital constraint
is violated with a positive probability, and if he bids pi > pi (x), his expected pro￿ts are
reduced.
Any o⁄er (pi;qi) with pi > pi (x) is weakly dominated by the alternate o⁄er (pi (x);qi).
39The alternate o⁄er weakly increases buyer i￿ s pro￿ts, with a strict increase whenever ￿i￿ s
o⁄er is lower, and leaves the probability that his capital constraint is satis￿ed unchanged.
Finally, any o⁄er (pi;qi) such that pi 2 [pi (0);pi (x)) gives negative pro￿ts whenever it is
accepted (e.g., if p￿i = pi (0)) and is weakly dominated by ~ pi = 0 (which gives zero pro￿ts),
as follows. If p￿i ￿ pi (0), the o⁄er ~ pi = 0 guarantees that his capital constraint is satis￿ed.
If instead p￿i < pi (0), the o⁄er ~ pi = 0 weakly reduces the probability that buyer i￿ s capital
constraint will be violated; under ~ pi = 0, the constraint is violated with probability p￿i,
while under (pi;qi), it is violated with probability pi if qi = x and a probability of at least
p￿i, otherwise. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4 (The lemma holds as stated in the main text, subject to the assumption
that maxf￿1;￿2g ￿ minf2￿1;2￿2g. The case maxf￿1;￿2g > minf2￿1;2￿2g is covered
by the general version of Proposition 5, stated below.)
First, consider the case ￿1 6= ￿2, and assume, without loss of generality, that ￿1 > ￿2.
If p2 (x) = 2￿2, buyer 2 bids p2 = 2￿2 (Lemma 3); therefore, buyer 1￿ s best response is to
bid p1 = 2￿2+". If p2 (x) < 2￿2, then from Lemma 3, p2 < 2￿2, and standard competition
arguments imply that buyer 2 bids p2 = 2￿2 ￿" and buyer 1 bids p1 = 2￿2. Next, consider
the case ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿. If maxfp1 (x);p2 (x)g = 2￿, then by Lemma 3, the equilibrium
price is 2￿ and is posted by the buyer with the highest pi (x). If maxfp1 (x);p2 (x)g < 2￿,
Lemma A-2 and standard competition arguments imply that both buyers post the price
2￿ ￿ " for the full amount. Q.E.D.
Lemma A-3 (Second elimination round) Suppose p1 (x) ￿ 2￿1 and p2 (x) > 2￿2.
(i) If p2 (0) ￿ maxf￿1;p1 (x)g ￿ p2(x), no o⁄er (p2;q2) with p2 = p2 (x) survives two
rounds of elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
(ii) If p2 (0) > maxf￿1;p1 (x)g, the only o⁄er (p2;q2) with p2 > maxf2￿2;￿1;p1 (x)g to
survive two rounds of elimination of weakly dominated strategies is (p2;q2) = (p2 (x);x).
40Proof of Lemma A-3. From Lemma A-2, p2 (x) > p2 (0) > 2￿2. From the ￿rst round of
elimination (Lemma 3), buyer 1 bids p1 2 [maxf￿1;p1 (x)g;2￿1] and q1 = x, buyer 2 bids
either p2 = p2 (x) or p2 < p2 (0), and the o⁄ers p2 = 0 and (p2;q2) = (p2 (x);x) survived.
Part (i): Since p1 ￿ maxf￿1;p1 (x)g ￿ p2 (0), the o⁄er ~ p2 = 0 guarantees that buyer
2 makes zero pro￿ts and his capital constraint is satis￿ed. In contrast, o⁄ering p2 = p2 (x)
generates strictly negative pro￿ts whenever it is accepted (e.g., if p1 = maxf￿1;p1 (x)g).
Part (ii): The o⁄er (p2;q2) = (p2 (x);x) survives the second elimination round, since
it is a unique best response for buyer 2 if buyer 1 o⁄ers (p1;q1) = (maxf￿1;p1 (x)g;x).
Speci￿cally, under (p2 (x);x) buyer 20s capital constraint is satis￿ed, while under any other
o⁄er that survives the ￿rst round, the capital constraint is violated with a positive prob-
ability. Moreover, any o⁄er (p2;q2) remaining after the ￿rst elimination round, such that
p2 2 (maxf2￿2;￿1;p1 (x)g;p2 (x)), or p2 = p2 (x) and q2 < x, is weakly dominated by
~ p2 = 0, which weakly increases pro￿ts (strictly if p1 = 0) and weakly decreases the probabil-
ity of violating the capital constraint. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5 (As stated in the text, but to cover the case maxf￿1;￿2g >
minf2￿1;2￿2g, pi(x) is replaced by maxf￿i;pi(x)g for i 2 f1;2g.)
From the ￿rst elimination round (Lemma 3), we know that buyer 1 bids for the entire
amount; therefore, whenever the seller accepts buyer 1￿ s o⁄er, the expected value of v drops
to 1
2p1, regardless of buyer 2￿ s o⁄er. In addition, maxf￿1;p1 (x)g ￿ p1 ￿ 2￿1.
Part (A), maxf￿2;p2 (0)g ￿ maxf￿1;p1 (x)g: First, consider the case maxf￿1;p1 (x)g ￿
2￿2. Since p2 (0) ￿ 2￿2, Lemma A-2 implies that p2 (x) ￿ p2 (0) ￿ 2￿2. Moreover, it
is easy to show that p2 (x) ￿ 2￿1. So Lemma 4 applies, completing the proof of this
case. Second, consider the case maxf￿1;p1 (x)g > 2￿2; we must show the sale price is
maxf￿1;p1 (x)g. If p2 (x) ￿ 2￿2, then from the ￿rst elimination round, buyer 2 bids at
most 2￿2, and since maxf￿1;p1 (x)g > 2￿2, buyer 1 bids (p1;q1) = (maxf￿1;p1 (x)g;x),
which is his unique best response. If instead p2 (x) > 2￿2, then any o⁄er (p2;q2) with
41p2 ￿ p2 (0) and p2 6= p2 (x) is eliminated in the ￿rst stage, while the o⁄er ~ p2 = 0 remains.
If p2 (x) < maxf￿1;p1 (x)g, then since p2 ￿ p2 (x), the unique best response for buyer 1
is to o⁄er (p1;q1) = (maxf￿1;p1 (x)g;x). If p2 (x) ￿ maxf￿1;p1 (x)g, a second round of
elimination (Lemma A-3) implies that buyer 2 o⁄ers p2 < p2 (0); hence, the unique best
response for buyer 1 is to o⁄er (p1;q1) = (maxf￿1;p1 (x)g;x).
Part (B), maxf￿2;p2 (0)g > maxf￿1;p1 (x)g: Start with the case p2 (x) ￿ 2￿2. If
p2 (x) > 2￿1, then p2 (0) > 2￿1 (Lemma A-2), and since buyer 1 bids p1 ￿ 2￿1, buyer 2￿ s
unique best response is to o⁄er (p2;q2) = (maxf￿2;p2 (x)g;x); the seller accepts whenever
v ￿ p2. If instead p2 (x) ￿ 2￿1, then since p2 (0) ￿ 2￿2 (Lemma A-2), it follows that
maxf￿1;p1 (x)g ￿ 2￿2. Lemma 4 then applies, completing the proof.
The remainder of the proof deals with the case p2 (x) > 2￿2; we must show the sale price
is p2 (x) (￿ "). From the ￿rst elimination round, buyer 2￿ s o⁄er must satisfy p2 ￿ p2 (x).
From Lemma A-2, maxf2￿2;￿1;p1 (x)g < p2 (0) < p2 (x).
There is no equilibrium in which buyer 2 bids p2 ￿ maxf2￿2;￿1;p1 (x)g and buyer
1 bids p1 > p2, as follows. In any such equilibrium, q1 = x, and p1 would be either
maxf2￿2;￿1;p1 (x)g or maxf2￿2;￿1;p1 (x)g+", and hence below p2 (0). So buyer 2￿ s capi-
tal constraint is violated whenever v ￿ p1; but then buyer 2 would deviate to o⁄er (p2;q2) =
(p2 (x);x). Nor is there an equilibrium in which buyer 2 bids p2 ￿ maxf2￿2;￿1;p1 (x)g
and buyer 1 bids p1 ￿ p2. To see this, note that maxf2￿2;￿1;p1 (x)g < p2 (0), and so
buyer 2￿ s capital constraint would certainly be violated whenever v ￿ p1, and again buyer
2 would deviate to o⁄er (p2;q2) = (p2 (x);x). Consequently, the second elimination round
(Lemma A-3) implies that (p2;q2) = (p2 (x);x) in any candidate equilibrium. Hence, if
p2 (x) < 2￿1, the unique equilibrium is that buyer 2 bids (p2;q2) = (p2 (x);x) and buyer 1
bids (p1;q1) = (p2 (x) + ";x). If instead, p2 (x) ￿ 2￿1, the unique equilibrium outcome is
that buyer 2 bids (p2;q2) = (p2 (x);x), and the equilibrium price is p2 (x). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. (The proposition as stated in the main text continues to hold
42even without the assumption maxf￿1;￿2g ￿ minf2￿1;2￿2g.)
From Lemma A-2, pi (x) > pi (0) > 2￿i for i 2 f1;2g. From the ￿rst elimination round
(Lemma 3), either pi = pi (x), or pi < pi (0), for i 2 f1;2g. In addition, we know that for
i 2 f1;2g, the o⁄ers pi = 0 and (pi;qi) = (pi (x);x) survive the ￿rst round. In fact, the
o⁄ers p1 = 0 and p2 = 0 cannot be eliminated in any round, since each one is a unique
best response against the other. Hence, the no trade equilibrium survives the elimination
process. The remainder of the proof establishes that, provided p1 (x) 6= p2 (x), this is the
unique equilibrium to survive the elimination process.
Start with the case p1 (0) > p2 (x). The o⁄er (p1;q1) = (p1 (x);x) survives the second
elimination round, since it is a unique best response if buyer 2 bids (p2;q2) = (p2 (x);x).
However, any o⁄er (p1;q1) with p1 2 (0;p1 (0)) is eliminated, since it violates buyer 1￿ s
capital constraint with a positive probability, while the o⁄er (p1 (x);x) never violates the
constraint.29 Hence, buyer 1 bids either p1 = 0 or (p1;q1) = (p1 (x);x). In the third
elimination round, the o⁄er p2 = 0 weakly dominates any other remaining o⁄er for buyer 2,
since p2 = 0 gives buyer 2 zero pro￿ts and guarantees that his capital constraint is satis￿ed,
while any other remaining o⁄er gives zero pro￿ts if p1 = p1 (x) and leads to negative pro￿ts
and/or violates buyer 2￿ s capital constraint, if p1 = 0. Hence, the unique equilibrium that
survives the third elimination round is that both buyers bid nothing. The case p2 (0) > p1 (x)
is similar.
The rest of the proof deals with the case in which both p1 (0) ￿ p2 (x) and p2 (0) ￿ p1 (x);
and without loss, assume p1 (x) < p2 (x).
Note ￿rst that if there is no o⁄er (￿ pi; ￿ qi) with ￿ pi 2 (0;p￿i (0)) that survives the ￿rst
elimination round, then (from the second elimination round) the other buyer ￿i must o⁄er
p￿i = 0, and the unique equilibrium is no trade, and the proof is complete. The rest of
the proof deals with the case in which for both buyers an o⁄er (￿ pi; ￿ qi) with ￿ pi 2 (0;p￿i (0))
29If p2 = 0 or (p2 < p1 and q1 = x), (p1;q1) violates with probability p1. If 0 < p2 < p1 and q1 < x, it
violates with probability of at least p2. If p2 ￿ p1, we know from the ￿rst round that p2 ￿ p2(x) < p1(0),
and so the o⁄er (p1;q1) violates the constraint with probability of at least p1.
43survives the ￿rst round. Consequently, for each buyer i the o⁄er (pi (x);x) survives the
second round, since it is a unique best response when the buyer ￿i bids (￿ p￿i; ￿ q￿i).
Next, we show that no o⁄er (p2;q2) with q2 = x and p1 (0) ￿ p2 < p2 (0) survives the
second elimination round. In particular, any such o⁄er is weakly dominated by ~ p2 = 0, as
follows. If (p1;q1) = (p1 (x);x), buyer 2 is indi⁄erent between ~ p2 = 0 and (p2;q2), since
in both cases he obtains zero pro￿ts and his capital constraint is satis￿ed. If p1 = 0, or if
p1 = p1 (x) and q1 < x, buyer 2 strictly prefers ~ p2 = 0. It remains to show that buyer 2 weakly
prefers ~ p2 = 0 to (p2;q2), given all other potential o⁄ers from buyer 1 that survive the ￿rst
round; any such o⁄er would have p1 2 (0;p1 (0)). Given such o⁄er, if buyer 2 o⁄ers ~ p2 = 0,
his capital constraint is violated with probability p1, but if he chooses p2 2 [p1 (0);p2 (0))
and q2 = x, his capital constraint is violated with a higher probability, namely p2.
In the third elimination round, any o⁄er (p1;q1) such that p1 2 (0;p1 (0)) is eliminated,
since it is weakly dominated by the o⁄er (p1 (x);x), as follows. If (p2;q2) = (p2 (x);x), both
o⁄ers provide the same utility. If instead, p2 < p2 (0), either p2 2 [p1 (0);p2 (0)) and (from
the argument immediately above) q2 < x; or p2 < p1 (0). In either case, buyer 1￿ s capital
constraint is violated with a positive probability under the o⁄er (p1;q1) but is never violated
under the o⁄er (p1 (x);x). Hence, buyer 1 bids either p1 = 0 or p1 = p1 (x). If p1 = p1 (x) is
eliminated in the third round, we are done and the unique equilibrium is no trade; otherwise,
since p2 (0) ￿ p1 (x), the only o⁄er for buyer 2 that survives the fourth round of elimination
is p2 = 0, and the unique equilibrium is no trade. Q.E.D.
Appendix C: Optimality of Linear Price Schedules
Proof of Proposition 1. We prove the proposition for the more general case in which the
asset value v is not restricted to be uniformly distributed. Instead, we assume only that the
conditional expectation E(vjv ￿ p) is di⁄erentiable with respect to p, with the derivative
bounded away from zero. We write h(p) ￿ E(vjv ￿ p) + ￿ and replace Assumption 1
44with the more general assumption h0(p) ￿ x
M+x; note that when v is uniformly distributed,
h0 (p) = 1
2, and so this reduces to M ￿ x. We also assume that the asset is divisible into N
individual units and write xN ￿ x
N. N can be arbitrarily large.
We ￿rst show that the revelation principle holds in our setting. Consider a nondirect
mechanism. The outcome is the number of units transferred from the seller to the buyer and
the total monetary payment from the buyer to the seller. From this (and taking as given the
mechanism and the buyer￿ s and seller￿ s strategies), the market determines the market value
of each unit h, using Bayes￿rule. To show that we can achieve the same outcome using a
direct revelation mechanism, we can use standard arguments plus the observation that since
the market observes the ￿nal outcome and only the ￿nal outcome, inferences regarding the
asset value (v) are the same in both mechanisms.
Any stochastic mechanism can be replaced by a deterministic mechanism. The latter
can leave expected payments unchanged and make it easier to satisfy the buyer￿ s capital
constraint. Any deterministic (direct) mechanism speci￿es a transfer of q (v) units of the
asset in exchange for a monetary payment of P (v) and is equivalent to giving the seller the
choice of quantity-price pairs in the menu f(q (v);P (v))g. Since the asset is divisible into
N units, and since for a given quantity the seller will always choose the quantity-price pair
that gives him the highest payment, without loss we can restrict attention to menus of the
type f(q;Pq) : q = 1;:::Ng. In turn, such menus are equivalent to o⁄ering a price schedule
p(￿) = (p1;p2;:::;pN), where pixN denotes the price paid for the i￿ th unit bought; that is, if
the buyer purchases n units (i.e., a quantity nxN of the asset), he pays xN
Pn
i=1 pi.
Next, we establish that for any price schedule p(￿), there exists an alternate price schedule
~ p(￿) that satis￿es ~ p1 ￿ ~ p2 ￿ ::: ￿ ~ pN and leaves all payo⁄s and capital constraints unchanged.
The basic idea is that if there exists k such that pk < pk+1, the seller would never sell just k
units, and hence, we can replace pk and pk+1 with their average. Formally, suppose pk < pk+1.
Let k be the smallest integer such that pi = pk for every integer i 2 [k;k], and let k be the




and de￿ne a new price schedule by ~ pi = p for i 2 [k;k], and ~ pi = pi otherwise. Recall that
we assume that if the seller is indi⁄erent between selling and not selling, he chooses to sell.
Note that if the seller chooses to sell only j units of asset even though the buyer is willing
to buy more than j units, we must have pj+1 < v ￿ 1
j￿j0+1
Pj
i=j0 pi for every j0 ￿ j. It then





In addition, by construction, if he sells any other quantity, he gets the same payo⁄ under
both schedules. Consequently, the seller￿ s response to and payo⁄ from the two schedules
are exactly the same. Hence, the buyer￿ s pro￿ts are also the same, and since the seller￿ s
behavior is the same, the information revealed in equilibrium is the same. Therefore, the
capital constraints are the same. Iteration of the argument above completes the proof of
the claim: the iteration process ends in a ￿nite number of steps, since under the new price
schedule, the number of prices pi that are di⁄erent from their follower pi+1 is strictly lower
than that in the original schedule.
Hence, we can assume, without loss of generality, that an optimal price schedule satis￿es
p1 ￿ p2 ￿ ::: ￿ pN. Under such a schedule, the seller sells the i￿ th unit if and only if v ￿ pi.
The capital constraint must be satis￿ed given any amount that the seller might choose
to sell. In particular, denote by n the largest i 2 f1;:::;Ng such that pi > 0. Then
the capital constraint associated with the sale of n units must be satis￿ed; that is, (M +
nxN)h(pn) ￿ xN(p1 + ::: + pn) ￿ L. Since pn is the lowest price in the set fp1;:::;png, the
capital constraint would also be satis￿ed under a linear schedule in which the buyer o⁄ers
to buy up to n units at a price per unit pn, i.e., (M + nxN)h(pn) ￿ nxNpn ￿ L. For
such a linear price schedule, this is the only relevant constraint, since whenever the seller
chooses to sell anything, he sells as much as he can. Note that the left-hand side of the
capital constraint is increasing as a function of pn: either h0 (pn) ￿ 1, in which case this is
immediate, or h0 (pn) < 1, in which case the derivative of the left-hand side with respect to pn
46is Mh0(pn) + nxN (h0 (pn) ￿ 1) ￿ Mh0(pn) + x(h0 (pn) ￿ 1) ￿ 0, where the second inequality
follows from h0 (p) ￿ x
M+x. Hence, the capital constraint would be satis￿ed under any linear
schedule in which the buyer o⁄ers to buy up to n units at a price per unit of p ￿ pn.
To complete the proof, we must show that the buyer can always weakly raise his prof-
its by deviating from his original nonlinear schedule and instead o⁄ering a linear sched-
ule with a price p ￿ pn. Writing pN+1 = 0, his pro￿ts under the original schedule are
xN
PN
i=1 Pr(v 2 (pi+1;pi])
Pi
k=1 (￿ + E [vjv 2 (pi+1;pi]] ￿ pk). Changing the order of sum-
mation, this reduces to xN
Pn
k=1 Pr(v ￿ pk)(￿ + E [vjv ￿ pk] ￿ pk), which is necessarily
weakly less than the pro￿ts xN
Pn
k=1 max~ p2fp1;:::;png Pr(v ￿ ~ p)(￿ + E [vjv ￿ ~ p] ￿ ~ p), which
the buyer can attain under a linear schedule in which he o⁄ers to buy up to n units of the
asset for a ￿xed price. Finally, the proof extends easily to the case in which the buyer has a
limited borrowing capacity as in Section 6.2. Q.E.D.
Appendix D: Limited Borrowing Capacity.
Part 1: Buyer is capital constrained
In this appendix, we characterize the optimal bidding strategy of a monopolist buyer when
his capital constraint (2) is replaced with ￿(1
2p + ￿￿)(M + q) ￿ pq ￿ L, where ￿ 2 (0;2)
and ￿ 2 [0;1]. The case ￿ > 1 does not re￿ ect borrowing constraints but is useful when
we discuss marking to market in Section 6.3. We replace Assumption 1 with x < ￿
2￿￿M
and de￿ne leverage as ￿ = L
( 1
2+￿￿)M, which generalizes the de￿nition in the text. We also
generalize the de￿nition of p(q) in equation (3), so that p(q) ￿
2￿￿cq
1￿￿q , where ￿ ￿ L
￿M ￿ ￿￿,
￿ ￿ 2￿￿
￿M , and c ￿
2￿￿
M .
Proposition A-1 (i) If
￿￿
2￿￿ < 1, trade can happen if and only if leverage is low; that is,
￿ <
2￿(1+￿)￿
1+2￿￿ . If leverage is very low, the buyer o⁄ers to buy the entire quantity x for a price
￿. As leverage increases, the buyer increases the price; and as leverage increases further,
the buyer also reduces the quantity. Both price and quantity are continuous in leverage.
47As leverage approaches
2￿(1+￿)￿
1+2￿￿ , the price approaches 2￿ and the quantity approaches zero.
Expected volume is continuous in leverage; it ￿rst increases and then drops to zero.
(ii) If
￿￿
2￿￿ ￿ 1, trade can happen if and only if leverage is su¢ ciently low, so that
p(x) ￿ 2￿ . If trade happens, the buyer o⁄ers to buy the entire quantity x for a price per
unit maxf￿;p(x)g, which is weakly increasing in initial leverage ￿.
Proof of Proposition A-1.
For use below, note that ￿ = ￿
1+2￿￿
2￿ ￿ ￿￿; that is, ￿ is a monotone increasing func-
tion of leverage. Since 1 ￿ ￿q > 0 (from x < ￿
2￿￿M), the capital constraint can be







(1￿￿q)2 . Thus, minq2[0;x] p(q) =
￿
p(0) if ￿ ￿
￿￿￿
2￿￿
p(x) if ￿ ￿
￿￿￿
2￿￿.
Trade is possible if and only if there exists a quantity q 2 (0;x], such
that p(q) ￿ 2￿, so that the buyer makes nonnegative pro￿ts; that is, if either p(x) ￿ 2￿ or
p(0) = 2￿ < 2￿. Hence, trade is possible if and only if ￿ falls in some lower interval.
Case 1:
￿￿
2￿￿ < 1. At ￿ = ￿, p(x) > p(0) = 2￿. Thus, trade is impossible for ￿ ￿ ￿
but is possible for all ￿ < ￿, or equivalently, ￿ <
2￿(1+￿)￿
1+2￿￿ . Next, we characterize the buyer￿ s
o⁄er when ￿ < ￿. If p(x) ￿ ￿, which is equivalent to ￿ ￿ 1
2 (￿ ￿ ￿￿x + cx), the capital
constraint does not bind and the buyer makes the benchmark o⁄er (x;￿). If ￿ ￿
￿￿
2￿￿￿,
increasing q relaxes the capital constraint, and since ￿ < ￿ we know the buyer has a strictly
pro￿table trade. Consequently, the buyer bids for the entire amount x available and chooses
a price maxf￿;p(x)g. This price is weakly increasing in ￿, and hence in initial leverage ￿.




2 (￿ ￿ ￿￿x + cx)
￿
but below ￿. Since ￿ < ￿, we know that the buyer has a
strictly pro￿table trade. Moreover, any strictly pro￿table trade in which the capital constraint
is slack is strictly dominated by one in which it binds: either q < x, in which case q can be
increased, or q = x and p > p(x) > ￿, in which case p can be decreased. Consequently, the
buyer￿ s best o⁄er is the solution to the more constrained maximization problem in which he





@qq￿ (p(q)) = ￿ (p(q)) + qp0 (q)￿0 (p(q)), and recall p0 (q) > 0 in the interval
under consideration. Hence, (A-1) has a unique solution, as follows: if q￿ (p(q)) > 0 and
@
@qq￿ (p(q)) ￿ 0 for some q, then ￿0 (p(q)) < 0, and so by the strict concavity of ￿ and
the strict convexity of p, it follows that @
@qq￿ (p(q)) < 0 for all higher q. Moreover, the
maximizer of (A-1) must be such that ￿0 (p(q)) < 0 (if the maximizer is the corner q = x,
this follows from p(x) > ￿). Hence, in the interval from which the maximizer of (A-1) is
drawn, @
@qq￿ (p(q)) strictly decreases in ￿. Hence, the buyer￿ s choice of q weakly decreases
as ￿ (and hence initial leverage ￿) increases. Note also that if q is strictly decreasing at any
￿, the same is true for all higher ￿.
For the e⁄ect of ￿ (and hence leverage) on the price o⁄ered, note ￿rst that if the buyer
o⁄ers to buy everything (q = x) for price p(x), it follows immediately that the price increases.
If instead the buyer o⁄ers to buy q < x, the price satis￿es p = p(q), and the optimal p
solves maxp2[0;1] q(p)￿(p), where q(p) =
p￿2￿
￿p￿c is the inverse function of p(q). Observe that
@
@pq(p)￿(p) = q0(p)￿(p)+q(p)￿0(p); q0(p) =
2￿￿￿c
(￿p￿c)2 > 0; and recall that the optimal p satis￿es
￿0(p) < 0. Hence, in the interval in which the (unique) optimal p is drawn, @
@pq(p)￿(p)
strictly increases in ￿ and strictly decreases in p (the last part follows from the concavity of
￿ and q). Hence, the optimal p increases in ￿.
From the analysis above, the buyer￿ s o⁄er is continuous as a function of ￿. Finally,
as ￿ approaches ￿, only o⁄ers with q close to 0 can satisfy the capital constraint (with a
price below 2￿). It follows easily that as ￿ approaches ￿, the buyer￿ s o⁄er converges to
(q;p) = (0;2￿). The expected volume (pq) converges to 0.
To show that expected volume ￿rst increases in leverage, it is enough to show that there
exists some interval to the right of 1
2 (￿ ￿ ￿￿x + cx) such that when ￿ falls in this interval,
the buyer o⁄ers to buy everything, q = x. If
￿￿
2￿￿￿ > 1
2 (￿ ￿ ￿￿x + cx), this is immediate
49from the analysis above. Otherwise, note that at ￿ = 1












> 0 over some interval to the right of 1
2(￿ ￿ ￿￿x + cx), implying that the
buyer o⁄ers to buy q = x in this interval.
From the analysis above, q must eventually be strictly decreasing in ￿, (and if it is
strictly decreasing at some ￿, the same is true for all higher ￿ up to ￿, when trade becomes









qp0(q)], which is strictly negative in the interval under consideration.
Case 2:
￿￿
2￿￿ ￿ 1 (contains Proposition 3 as a special case) In this case, at ￿ = ￿,
p(x) ￿ p(0) = 2￿, and so p(x) ￿ 2￿: Hence, trade is certainly possible up to ￿ = ￿. Hence,
trade is possible for all ￿ weakly below the cuto⁄ value of ￿ such that p(x) = 2￿. The




Changes in ￿: From the capital constraint ￿(1
2p + ￿￿)(M + q) ￿ pq ￿ L, it follows that
if trade is possible when ￿ = ￿0, it is also possible when ￿ ￿ ￿0. Also observe that ￿, p(q),
and p0(q) strictly decrease in ￿. Hence, following similar steps as above, one can show that
increasing ￿ has a similar e⁄ect on the price and quantity as does reducing ￿. Q.E.D.
Part 2: Seller is capital constrained
Next, we analyze the case in which the seller faces borrowing restrictions, and his capital
constraint (8) is given by 1





. Since increasing q relaxes the capital constraint, the claim that the buyer
o⁄ers either q = 0 or q = x continues to hold. Intuitively, since the expected value of the
asset conditional on the seller accepting the o⁄er is less than the sale price (for standard
adverse selection reasons), replacing assets with cash relaxes the capital constraint. Trade
can occur if and only if ￿ ￿ 2￿[￿ + (2 ￿ ￿) x
Ms], and if trade occurs, the buyer o⁄ers to buy




50Appendix E: Competition With Nonlinear Schedules
Proposition A-2 The equilibrium outcomes discussed in Section 5 (in particular, Lemma
4 and Propositions 5 and 6) remain even if a buyer can deviate by o⁄ering a nonlinear price
schedule rather than a linear schedule.




2) be a pair of equilibrium o⁄ers when
buyers are restricted to use linear price schedules. Without loss, q￿
1 = q￿
2 = N, with the
interpretation that p￿
i = 0 is the same as not making an o⁄er. We show that neither buyer
has an incentive to deviate to a nonlinear schedule. We show that buyer 1 has no incentive
to deviate; the proof that buyer 2 has no incentive to deviate is symmetric.
Step 1: First, we show that without loss we can restrict attention to deviations to a
nonincreasing price schedule. The proof is along the lines of the proof of Proposition 1.
Speci￿cally, as before denote buyer 1￿ s nonlinear price schedule by p1;p2;:::;pN, where pi is
the price buyer 1 pays for the i￿ th unit acquired. We then follow the same iterative process
as before and replace any subsequence pk = ::: = pk < pk+1 = ::: = p￿ k with the average of
these ￿ k ￿ k + 1 prices. If this replacement leaves outcomes una⁄ected for all realizations of
the seller valuation v, then we proceed to the next step, exactly as in the monopoly case.
The additional step necessitated by competition is the case in which the replacement
a⁄ects outcomes for some realization v0 of v. This case arises only if, under the original
schedule, there is a positive probability that the seller sells k0 2 fk;:::;￿ k￿1g units to buyer
1. Because pk = ::: = pk < pk+1 = ::: = p￿ k, this can happen only if buyer 2￿ s o⁄ered price
p￿
2 is weakly above both pk+1 and v0, and if buyer 2￿ s maximum quantity is weakly above
N ￿ ￿ k + 1. Moreover, buyer 2￿ s price p￿




j=k0+1 pj (l ￿ N ￿k0), since otherwise the seller could do better by selling more to buyer
1.





j=k0+1 pj for all l, this leaves outcomes unchanged, since the seller never




j=k0+1 pj for some l,
the new schedule gives buyer 1 the same pro￿ts: if instead the new schedule strictly lowered
pro￿ts, this would imply that buyer 1 could have improved pro￿ts under the original schedule
by slightly increasing his o⁄ered price. Moreover, because under the original schedule there
was some probability of the seller accepting buyer 2￿ s o⁄er, buyer 1￿ s capital constraint
remains satis￿ed for all realizations of v under the new schedule.
Step 2: From step 1, buyer 1 can restrict himself to deviations that satisfy p1 ￿ p2 ￿
::: ￿ pN. The seller e⁄ectively sees a nonincreasing schedule that is a combination of the
schedules o⁄ered by the two buyers. If p￿
2 = 0 or p￿
2 < pN, the seller never sells to buyer 2
and the proof is as in Proposition 1. Below, we deal with the case in which p￿
2 ￿ pN. Denote
by n￿ the largest i 2 f1;2;:::;Ng, such that pi ￿ p￿
2.
For use below denote f(N) = xN
PN
k=1 Pr(v ￿ pk)(￿ + E [vjv ￿ pk] ￿ pk), which is the
monopolist buyer￿ s expected pro￿ts from Appendix C. Since q￿
2 = N, the seller sells at most
n￿ units to buyer 1. In particular, if v ￿ p￿
2, the seller sells all N units, and the market
valuation of the asset is h(p￿
2). Since there is a positive probability that the seller sells n￿
units to buyer 1, the following capital constraint for buyer 1 must hold: (M +n￿xN)h(p￿
2)￿
xN(p1 + ::: + pn￿) ￿ L. The rest of the proof then follows as in Proposition 1, but we need
to take into account potential ties. In particular, if there are no ties, the buyer￿ s expected
pro￿ts under the original schedule are at most f(n￿), and if there are ties (e.g., pn￿ = p￿
2),
pro￿ts are less than f(n￿). In contrast, if the buyer o⁄ers to buy up to n￿ units at a price per
unit p 2 fp1;:::;pn￿g, he obtains xNn￿ Pn
k=1 Pr(v ￿ p)(￿ + E [vjv ￿ p] ￿ p), unless p = p￿
2.
In the special case p = p￿
2, the seller might sell less than n￿ to buyer 1. However, if buyer
1 makes positive pro￿ts when he purchases n￿ units at a price per unit p￿
2, he also makes
positive pro￿ts when he purchases N units at a slightly higher price. By o⁄ering to buy up
to N units at a price per unit slightly higher than p￿
2, buyer 1 can avoid ties and guarantee
that the seller sells everything to him. Q.E.D.
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